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WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE:
LEGAL CONTROLS AND FUTURE






In the last few years, there have been an increasing
number of domestic and international efforts aimed at
restricting the transportation of hazardous wastes
across international borders for disposal and recycling.1
There are now many new international agreements that
limit or even prohibit the transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes; there are also ongoing domestic ef-
forts to adopt similar restrictions. 2 If this trend contin-
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1. See JONATHAN KRUEGAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE
BASEL CONVENTION 83 (1999) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
TRADE] (identifying eight agreements affecting the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous wastes).
2. See infra notes 93-172 and accompanying text (de-
scribing hazardous waste trading restrictions'established by
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ues the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes
will become an increasingly limited or financially im-
practical trade practice.
The growth in restrictive efforts arises from the con-
cern that waste may be improperly managed after ex-
portation.3 It is feared that the transportation, han-
dling, and disposal of exported hazardous wastes may
contribute to Increased risks to human health and the
environment. 4 In light of such concerns, some nations
support a prohibition on the transboundary movement
of hazardous waste. 5
the international agreements); see infra notes 90-91 and ac-
companying text (discussing efforts to reform domestic re-
quirements applicable to hazardous wastes trading).
3. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 1, at 10-11 (de-
scribing incidents when exported hazardous waste was im-
properly managed which resulted in significant risks to hu-
man health and the environment); David Eaton, NAFTA and
the Environment: A Proposal for Free Trade in Hazardous
Waste Between the United States and Mexico, 27 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 715, 719-24 (1996) [hereinafter NAFTA and the Environ-
ment] (stating that exported U.S. wastes are often disposed of
illegally in Mexico): LaRue Corbin et al., Comment, The Envi-
ronment, Free Trade, and Hazardous Waste: A Study of the
U.S.-Mexico Border Environmental Problems in Light of Free
Trade, 1 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 183, 184 (1994) (asserting
that U.S. wastes exported to Mexico are neither properly re-
cycled nor disposed of in ways that are consistent with envi-
ronmental protection).
4. See, e.g., Toxic Waste Convention Debates Ban
Dumping in Developing Countries, (Feb. 27, 1998) The Minne-
sota Daily Online, available at <http://www.mndaily.
com/daily/ 1998/02/27/worldnation/wn4.ap.html> (de-
scribing how the improper disposal of hazardous wastes may
contribute to water contamination, disease, and increased air
pollution).
5. See infra notes 155-172 and accompanying text (de-
scribing how receiving countries' concerns over the regula-
tion of the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes
have resulted in waste trading prohibitions and other re-
strictive measures).
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While it is critical to ensure that exported wastes are
properly managed, the benefits resulting from the
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes cannot
be ignored. The trade practice can facilitate the safe
management and disposal of hazardous waste, 6 as well
as provide receiving countries with jobs, income, capital
investment, and access to important resources. 7 For
such reasons, the imposition of hazardous waste trading
restrictions must be carefully evaluated against poten-
tial benefits associated with the transboundary move-
ment of hazardous waste.
As efforts to restrict hazardous waste trading increase,
there are also compelling reasons for generators to ex-
port hazardous wastes across international borders.
Due to the extensive regulatory burdens and environ-
mental compliance costs affecting American business 8
6. See Administration Considering Bilaterals to Let Basel
Parties Export Waste to United States, INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA),
Vol. 19, No. 8, April 17, 1996 at 305 (stating that waste sent
to the United States may be better managed at less expense
than if the waste remained within the country of origin);
CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, CMA NEWS, Vol. 27,
No. 7, at 6 (Sept. 1999) (describing how companies may ship
hazardous waste to the United States for safer disposal).
7. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, In Charles County, Trash Talk
Hits Home, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1999, at Cl, C7 (stating
that the establishment of a waste disposal facility provided
the community with tax revenue, employment opportunities,
and money for schools); Donald Baker, In Virginia, Support
Grows for Landfill Restraints, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1998, at
B 1 (noting that some localities want to import wastes in order
to obtain the economic benefits resulting from importation).
See also infra notes 186-187 and accompanying text (de-
scribing how developing countries may rely on imported haz-
ardous wastes as a source for materials).
8. Environmental requirements in the United States are
so extensive that one poll found over seventy percent of cor-
porate general counsels believed that compliance with both
Federal and State environmental laws was impossible. See
Marianne Lavelle, Environmental Vise: Law, Compliance,
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U.S. hazardous waste generators can decrease expen-
ditures by shifting activities abroad. 9 While there is fre-
quent opposition to the establishment of new treatment
and disposal facilities in the United States, 10 both Mex-
ico and Canada offer numerous waste facilities in close
proximity to U.S. hazardous waste generators.11 Fur-
NAT'L L.J., Vol. 15, No. 52, Aug. 30, 1993, at $1-S2 (indicat-
ing that in a poll of over 200 corporate general counsels, over
seventy percent of the respondents stated that full compli-
ance with Federal and State environmental laws was impos-
sible). Most of the general counsels also indicated that the
regulatory system was too expensive, bureaucratic, and inef-
fective at pollution reduction. See id.
9. See Lavelle, supra note 8 (indicating that U.S. envi-
ronmental compliance obligations were so extensive that
some corporate officials considered siting future industrial
facilities outside the United States to avoid such burdens); E.
Donald Elliot, Environmental Law at a Crossroad, N. KY. L.
REv. 1, 1 (1992) (stating that the cost of environmental com-
pliance and cleanup is skyrocketing). The cost of complying
with U.S. environmental regulations amounts to nearly 2.5
percent of the gross domestic product each year. See id. Ex-
penditures allocated to comply with environmental regula-
tions represent almost half of all expenditures allocated to
regulatory compliance programs. See id. One outcome of
these compliance costs is that hazardous waste disposal fees
are much more expensive in the United States than in other
countries. See Sean Murphy, Prospective Liability for Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
24, 31 (1994).
10. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, In Charles County, Trash Talk
Hits Home, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1999, at C1 (describing
community opposition to local landfills); Donald Baker, In
Virginia, Support Grows for Landfill Restraints, WASH. POST,
Nov. 25, 1998, at B1, B5 (describing how local opposition
prompted politicians to restrict waste importation); Stephen
C. Jones, Inequities of Industrial Siting Addressed, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 16, 1993, at 20 (noting community opposition to indus-
trial facility siting practices). This opposition is often called
the "not in my backyard" ("NIMBY") syndrome. See id.
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thermore, because many domestic companies are ex-
panding operations in developing countries, the trans-
portation of hazardous wastes between company facili-
ties is likely to increase. 12
Several factors that are not specific to U.S. industries
support the future growth of the hazardous waste trade.
Hazardous waste largely originates from industries that
are integral to the development and support of modem
industrial societies.'3 As more nations become industri-
11. See Louis R. Vera-Morales, Dumping in the Interna-
tional Backyard: Exportation of Hazardous Wastes to Mexico,
7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 353, 354-55 (1994) (noting that the scar-
city of disposal sites in the United States has increased haz-
ardous waste exports to Mexico). See also Julienne I. Adler,
Comment, United States' Waste Export Control Program:
Burying Our Neighbors in Garbage, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 885,
893 (1991) (indicating that Mexico's geographic proximity to
the United States encourages American companies to trans-
fer their wastes to Mexican disposal facilities).
12. See, e.g., CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION,
CMA NEWS, Vol. 27, No. 7, at 7 (Sept. 1999). For example, a
chemical company may transfer hazardous wastes generated
at a foreign facility to a domestic facility for reprocessing or
disposal. See id. at 6.
13. See Report of the First Meeting of the Conference of
the Parties to the Basel Convention, at 2, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CHW. 1/24 (1992) (noting that industrialized countries
generate ninety-five percent of the world's hazardous waste).
Some of the industries that generate hazardous wastes in-
clude the production of iron, steel, nonferrious and precious
metals, as well as the creation of industrial chemicals. See
MOSTAFA K. TOLBA, Preface to the TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS
AND DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw,
BASIC DOCUMENTS XIII (Barbara Kwiatkowska & Alfred H. A.
Soons, eds. 1993). Although materials defined as "hazardous
waste" vary with each statute or international agreement,
materials contaminated with dioxins and heavy metals, such
as mercury, cadmium, lead, or organic wastes are generally
considered hazardous. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note
1, at 7. Hazardous waste can take many forms including:
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alized, the amount of hazardous waste and the difficul-
ties associated with hazardous waste transportation and
disposal will increase. 14 Finally, reduced global trans-
portation costs and increasing efforts to facilitate inter-
national trading options have further promoted the de-
velopment of hazardous waste trade. 15
To reconcile environmental concerns with the views of
parties interested in transporting hazardous wastes in-
ternationally, it will be necessary to improve existing
hazardous waste transportation practices through a va-
riety of regulatory mechanisms. To this end, this Article
discusses the legal authorities controlling hazardous
waste trading and suggests mechanisms to improve cur-
rent practices. Part I of this Article identifies and ana-
lyzes domestic requirements affecting the exportation of
hazardous wastes generated in the United States. Part
II of this Article examines significant aspects of interna-
tional agreements that may affect U.S. hazardous waste
exportation practices. Part III reviews all of these legal
approaches, addresses outstanding issues, and suggests
how to remedy problems associated with the existing
regulatory schemes. This Article concludes by indicat-
ing that unless exporting nations like the United States
undertake new reforms, it will be increasingly difficult, if
not financially impractical, for domestic generators to
export hazardous wastes.
liquid waste; sludge; used batteries; computer parts; or in-
cinerator ash. See id.
14. See TOLBA, supra note 13, at XIII.
15. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 1, at 21 (de-
scribing how the emergence of multilateral trading systems
has facilitated the transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes).
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I. DOMESTIC REQUIREMENTS AFFECTING THE TRANSBOUNDARY
MOVEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTES
The two major legal regimes governing hazardous
waste disposal in the United States are the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")16 and the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 17 In addition, though not
focused on environmental issues, the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution also significantly af-
fects the disposal of hazardous wastes.18
A. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
1. Background and Overview of RCRA
Congress enacted RCRA in 1976 to address the in-
creasing amounts of waste generated from the growth of
domestic industrial operations. 9 The primary goals of
RCRA include protecting human health and the envi-
ronment, and reducing the generation and land disposal
of hazardous waste.20 To accomplish these goals, RCRA
16. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1996) [hereinafter "RCRA"I.
17. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1996)
[hereinafter "CERCLA"].
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In addition, the U.S.
Department of Transportation ("DOT") has established re-
quirements indirectly affecting the disposal of hazardous
wastes through packing, handling, labeling, and transporta-
tion regulations. For example, DOT mandates that trans-
porters avoid carrying hazardous wastes through densely
populated neighborhoods, tunnels, narrow streets, and loca-
tions where crowds have assembled. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §
397.9(a) (1996).
19. See RCRA § 1002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a) (1996).
20. See id. at § 1003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (1996). In
order to minimize the generation and land disposal of haz-
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establishes a comprehensive control system that regu-
lates hazardous waste from generation until disposal.21
Under RCRA's regulatory scheme, hazardous waste is
defined as a type of solid waste. 22 To be considered haz-
ardous, a solid waste must exhibit a specific character-
istic, or must appear on an EPA hazardous waste list.23
It is important to note, however, that the term "hazard-
ous" has separate meanings in different regulatory con-
texts. In other words, a substance may not be "hazard-
ous" under RCRA, but may nevertheless be regulated as
ardous waste, it is necessary to encourage the use of process
substitution, materials recovery, recycling, reuse, and treat-
ment practices. See id.
21. See generally RCRA §§ 6921-6939, 42 U.S.C. §§
3001-3023 (1996) (establishing a comprehensive hazardous
waste management system).
22. RCRA defines the term "solid waste" broadly to in-
clude garbage, refuse, sludge, and other discarded material.
See RCRA § 1004(27); 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1996). It is im-
portant to note that a waste can qualify as a solid waste even
if the waste is not in a solid form. Solid wastes include liq-
uids, semisolids, and gases. See i.
23. See id. at § 3001 (identifying the criteria for the
identification and listing of hazardous wastes); 40 C.F.R. §
261.31-261.33 (1996). The four characteristics for deter-
mining the presence of a hazardous waste are ignitability,
corrosivity, reactivity, and toxicity. See id. Wastes are also
considered hazardous if they appear one of the EPA's four
hazardous wastes lists. In general terms, these lists contain:
spent solvents; wastes from specific sources such as waste-
water treatment sludge; discarded commercial chemical
products; off-specification container residues; and spill resi-
dues. See id. See also id. at § 1004(5) (defining "hazardous
waste" as a solid waste which may: (1) cause or significantly
contribute to an increase in mortality, or an increase in seri-
ous irreversible or incapacitating illness; or (2) pose a sub-
stantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, disposed of, or
otherwise managed).
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a "hazardous waste," "hazardous substance," or "haz-
ardous material" under other legal authorities. 24
Two of RCRA's main regulatory structures are its per-
mitting and waste tracking systems. RCRA's permitting
system forbids a hazardous waste disposal facility from
operating without a permit issued by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").25 To obtain a
permit, a facility must satisfy specific design and opera-
tional requirements. 26 The permitting system also re-
stricts certain disposal practices. 27  RCRA's waste
tracking system establishes recordkeeping, labeling, and
packaging requirements for waste generators, transport-
ers, and disposers. 28 The program operates through the
use of a manifest system that establishes a chain of re-
sponsibility for all the waste. 29 Therefore, if the waste is
24. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that material outside RCRA's defini-
tion of "hazardous waste" may nevertheless be considered a
"hazardous substance" under CERCLA). Moreover, the defi-
nition of "hazardous waste" under one statute may be differ-
ent than the definition of "hazardous waste" provided in an-
other statute. See, e.g., infra note 167 and accompanying
text (defining "hazardous waste" differently than RCRA).
25. RCRA § 3005(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1996). See
also 40 C.F.R. § 270 (1996) (outlining the permitting proc-
ess).
26. RCRA § 3004(o), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o) (1996). These
requirements include the use of groundwater monitoring,
leachate collection systems, and double liners. See id.
27. See, e.g., RCRA § 3004(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(c)(1)
(1996) (prohibiting the disposal of liquid hazardous wastes in
landfills).
28. See generally RCRA §§ 3002-3004, 42 U.S.C. §§
6922-6924 (1996) (providing standards applicable to gen-
erators and transporters of hazardous wastes, as well as
standards applicable to owners and operators of hazardous
waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities); 40 C.F.R. §
262-264 (1996) (same).
29. For example, after disposing of the wastes, the fa-
cility must send a copy of the waste manifest to the genera-
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misplaced, it is possible to identify when the problem
occurred as well as who is the responsible party. Most
States are authorized to oversee their own hazardous
waste programs subject to EPA's approval. 30
2. RCRA Provisions Specifically Affecting the
Exportation of Hazardous Wastes
a. Notice and Consent Requirements
Section 3017 of RCRA establishes a series of require-
ments governing the export of hazardous wastes. Before
waste leaves the United States, an exporter must pro-
vide EPA with detailed notice on the intended transfer.3 '
This notice discloses: the types and quantity of wastes
to be exported; the manner of transportation; the
method of disposal to be used within the receiving
country; and the name and address of the ultimate
treatment, storage, or disposal facility.3 2
tor. If the generator does not receive the disposal facility's
manifest within thirty-five days after the generator conveyed
the waste to the transporter, the generator must file an ex-
emption report with the EPA. 40 C.F.R. § 262.42 (1996).
30. See RCRA § 3006(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(a)-(b)
(1996) (authorizing the development of State hazardous
waste programs). The State program must operate according
to Federal guidelines and the EPA can revoke the authoriza-
tion if the State program does not comply with Federal stan-
dards. See RCRA § 3006(e), 42 U.S.C. §6926(e) (1996).
31. See RCRA § 3017(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(c) (1996) (de-
scribing export notification requirements); 40 C.F.R. § 262.50
- 262.58 (1996) (outlining requirements applicable to the ex-
portation of hazardous wastes).
32. See RCRA § 3017(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(c) (1996). In
describing the manner of transportation, the exporter must
disclose the estimated frequency or rate at which the waste is
to be exported, the ports of entry, and the times when the
waste will be exported. See id.
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After this information is supplied to the EPA, the U.S.
Secretary of State must forward a copy of the exporter's
notification to the receiving nation. 3 Before any export
may occur, the receiving nation must provide the Sec-
retary of State with a written consent to receive the
waste.34 Any waste shipment must conform to terms
specified by the receiving country.3 5 Ninety days after
the waste shipment, the consignee at the final destina-
tion must send a written confirmation of the waste's re-
ceipt to the exporter. 36 If the confirmation is not re-
ceived, the exporter must report its absence to EPA.37
Any alteration of the export plan requires another no-
tification and consent of the receiving nation.38 In addi-
tion, the exporter must file with the EPA an annual re-
port that identifies the types, quantities, frequencies,
and final destinations of all hazardous waste exported
during the previous year.3 9 However, even if the dis-
posal would not protect human health or the environ-
ment of the receiving country, the EPA cannot prevent
the waste's exportation. 40
There are fewer requirements if the United States and
the receiving country have entered into a specific
agreement for the transportation and disposal of haz-
33. See RCRA § 3017(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(d) (1996).
34. See id. Within thirty days of the Secretary of State's
receipt of the receiving country's consent, objection, or other
communication, a copy of the response is sent to the ex-
porter. See RCRA § 3017(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(e) (1996).
35. See RCRA § 3017(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a) (1996).
36. See 40 C.F.R. § 262.55(b) (1996).
37. See id.
38. See 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(c) (1996). Alterations that
necessitate another notification and consent of the receiving
country include variances in the means of transport or
quantity of the waste shipments. See id.
39. See RCRA § 3017(g), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(g) (1996).
40. See RCRA § 3017, 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (1996) (failing to
provide EPA with the authority to prevent an export once the
notice and consent requirements have been satisfied).
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ardous wastes. Where an agreement exists, an exporter
need only file a report of the transfer to the EPA and en-
sure that the waste transfer complies with applicable
requirements of the international agreement. 41  The
United States has entered into such agreements with
Canada and Mexico. 42
b. Enforcement Procedures
RCRA provides the EPA with a variety of enforcement
authorities applicable to the export of hazardous waste.
Section 3008 authorizes the EPA to issue compliance
orders for violations of RCRA requirements 43 as well as
seek injunctions and criminal penalties against RCRA
violators. 44 Any person who knowingly exports hazard-
41. See RCRA § 3017(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(0l (1996).
When such an agreement exists, the waste shipment must
conform to the terms of that agreement, regardless of any
conflicting RCRA provisions. See RCRA § 3017(a)(2), 42
U.S.C. § 6938(a)(2) (1996); RCRA § 3017(0, 42 U.S.C. §
6938(f) (1996).
42. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Canada
Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Waste, Nov. 8, 1986, 39 Can T.S. 1986; Annex III to the
Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improve-
ment of the Environment in the Border Area, Jan. 29, 1987
(U.S.-Mex.). See also Jason L. Gudofsky, Transboundary
Shipments of Hazardous Waste for Recycling and Recovery
Operations, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 219, 268-72 (1998) (providing
detailed discussion of these two agreements).
43. See RCRA § 3008(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1996).
These compliance orders can: (1) mandate compliance within
specified timeframes; (2) assess financial penalties for past
and current RCRA violations; and (3) suspend or revoke ex-
isting RCRA permits. See id.
44. See RCRA § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1996). In
situations where the EPA has delegated RCRA authority to a
State, the EPA must notify the State before issuing a compli-
ance order or commencing a civil action. See RCRA §
3008(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (2) (1996).
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ous waste without the consent of a receiving country, or
who exports hazardous waste in violation of an applica-
ble international agreement, may be subject to fines and
criminal imprisonment. 45
In addition to the civil and criminal penalties available
to the EPA, section 7002 of RCRA establishes a citizen
suit provision that creates the right to commence a civil
action against any person alleged to be in violation of
the statute. 46 The citizen suit provision authorizes the
recovery of attorneys' fees and other litigation costs. 47
However, there are restrictions that significantly limit
the potential use of the citizen suit provision. Section
7002 does not apply to suits outside the United States,48
45. See RCRA § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1996).
Fines may amount to $50,000 for each day of a violation, and
imprisonment may last up to two years. See id. at (7)(B).
Criminal penalties may also be brought against any person
who knowingly omits material information or makes a false
material statement or representation in any document used
for purposes of compliance with RCRA. See RCRA §
3008(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3) (1996). Any person who
knowingly exports hazardous waste and knows at the time of
export that the action places another person in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury may be subject to
fines as much as $250,000 and imprisonment up to fifteen
years. See RCRA § 3008(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1996). In
determining whether a defendant possessed a "knowing"
state of mind required by section 3008, it is necessary to ex-
amine whether the defendant: (1) was aware of the nature of
the conduct; (2) believed that circumstances for the conduct
existed; or (3) believed that the conduct was substantially
certain to cause death or serious bodily injury. See id at
(1)(1).
46. See RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1996).
The term "person" includes companies, corporations, part-
nerships, firms, and States. See RCRA § 1004(a)(15), 42
U.S.C. § 6903(a)(15) (1996).
47. See RCRA § 7002(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1996).
48. See Teresa Wallbaum, America's Lethal Export: The
Growing Trade in Hazardous Waste, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 889,
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and there are procedural restrictions limiting the avail-
ability of the, provision.49
3. The. Significance and Effect of RCRA on the
Export of Hazardous Wastes
RCRA provides U.S. generators with several incentives
to export hazardous wastes. The regulations governing
waste disposal in the United States are lengthy, time-
consuming, and burdensome. 50 RCRA also establishes a
variety of enforcement mechanisms and citizen suit op-
portunities applicable to domestic disposal activities.
All of these elements increase the costs and difficulties
914 (1991) (discussing the fact that RCRA does not have in-
ternational application). There is a presumption against the
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. In order for a law to
be applied outside the United States, there must be clear evi-
dence of Congress' intent to apply the law outside the United
States. See, e.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
49. See, e.g., RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)
(1996) (specifying that citizen suits Can only be brought for
existing violations); id. at § 7002(b) (requiring plaintiffs to
notify EPA, the State, and the alleged violator prior to legal
action); see id. at § 7002(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (b) (prohibiting
citizen suits if EPA or the State has commenced or is dili-
gently prosecuting against the alleged violation); id. at §
7002(g), 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (g) (establishing circumstances
where a transporter shall not be deemed to have contributed
to, or be contributing to, alleged violations that occurred af-
ter the waste left such transporter's possession).
50. See American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d
1177, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing the analysis of RCRA
as a "mind-numbing journey"). See also United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, Reinventing Environmental Pro-
tection, 1998 ANN. REP., at 63 (1999) (noting that despite ef-
forts to reduce the time required to comply with environ-
mental regulations (and RCRA requirements in particular),
the annual burden associated with EPA's environmental re-
quirements has remained unchanged over the last four
years).
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associated with waste disposal in the United States.51
Many of these difficulties are avoided by exporting haz-
ardous wastes. Because RCRA does not mandate
treatment, storage, or disposal requirements for foreign
receiving facilities, generators can export hazardous
waste outside the United States with limited involve-
ment and oversight from the EPA. In addition, because
RCRA's citizen suit provision only applies to domestic
actions, the likelihood of third-party involvement and
litigation is limited by exportation. 52 Each of these fac-
tors reduces the costs and challenges associated with
disposing hazardous wastes abroad.
B. The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act
1. Background and Overview of CERCLA
The catalyst for the enactment of CERCLA arose dur-
ing the 1970's as a result of environmental disasters
such as Love Canal53 and the Valley of the Drums.5 4 In
51. See, e.g., John W. Bagby et al., How Greed Was My
Balance Sheet?: Corporate Liability and Environmental Disclo-
sure, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 227-28 (1995) (discussing the
substantial resources that U.S. businesses devote toward
environmental compliance); Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird,
The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis,
8 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 272 (1991) (addressing the significant
costs of environmental compliance in the United States).
52. See RCRA § 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (Citizen Suits).
53. See ROGER FINDLEY and DANIEL FARBER, ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAw, 493 (3rd ed. 1991) (describing how the Hooker
Chemical and Plastics Corporation used a waterway as a de-
pository for approximately 352 million pounds of industrial
wastes). This contamination required the evacuation of
1,000 families and $30 million in cleanup expenses. See id.
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response to public alarm over such incidents, Congress
enacted CERCLA on December 11, 1980 to address the
release of hazardous substances. 5 The term "hazardous
substance" specifically includes hazardous wastes as
defined by RCRA.56
CERCLA provides funding for the cleanup of hazard-
ous substances by allocating response costs among the
parties responsible for contamination. 57 To accomplish
this function, CERCLA imposes a severe liability scheme
that greatly favors the recovery of costs incurred for re-
sponse action.5 8 CERCLA's liability scheme is composed
54. See S. REP. No. 96-848 at 4 (1980), reprinted in,
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION,
AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (Superfund) 311 (describing the
discovery of 17,000 drums of waste on a seven acre site near
Louisville, Kentucky). Approximately 6,000 of those drums
were releasing toxic chemicals into the environment. See id.
55. See S. Rep. No. 96-84 at 2 (1980); see also 16
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc., 50 (Dec. 15, 1980) (noting public
concern over environmental and public health hazards posed
by the improper disposal of hazardous substances).
56. See CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1996).
57. Federal agencies can conduct response actions
themselves and seek to recover their costs from responsible
parties, or may compel a responsible party to conduct the
response action. CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1996);
Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2,923 (1987). In situa-
tions where no responsible party is available, the response
action is paid for through the Hazardous Substance Super-
fund which is funded through chemical and oil related taxes.
See CERCLA § 111 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (a) (1996).
58. Responsible parties are liable for: all government
costs of removal or remedial action consistent with the Na-
tional Contingency Plan ("NCP") (as provided for in § 105 of
CERCLA); any other necessary response costs incurred by
any other person consistent with the NCP; damages for injury
to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources; and the costs
of specified health assessment or health effects studies. See
CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1996).
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of three major components. First, CERCLA establishes
that a broad range of persons may be potentially re-
sponsible parties ("PRPs"). Section 107 of CERCLA pro-
vides that: current owners and operators of disposal
sites; past owners and operators of disposal sites; per-
sons who arranged for disposal; and transporters of
hazardous substances are all potentially liable for the
payment of response costs. 59
Second, CERCLA establishes that responsible parties
may be liable for all of the government's response costs
even if that party acted without negligence or illegal in-
tention. 60 It makes no difference that the party contrib-
uted only a small portion of the released hazardous
substance. 61 The government can still recover all ex-
penses associated with a response action, including di-
rect costs, indirect costs, and interest.62
Third, CERCLA provides limited defenses to its liability
scheme.63 Liability can only be avoided when the release
resulted from: an act of God; an act of war; an act or
omission of a third party; or any combination of those
defenses. 64 Moreover, some courts have eliminated proof
59. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1996).
60. Because of the strict liability scheme, a responsible
party may be liable even if that party complied with all appli-
cable requirements at the time of disposal.
61. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1996).
The responsible party may, however, seek financial contribu-
tion from other PRPs pursuant to CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a). Section 113(f) provides that any person may seek
contribution from any party potentially liable under CERCLA
§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). In resolving a claim for contri-
bution, a court may allocate response costs using such eq-
uitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. See
CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1996).
62. See United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d
1497, 1499 (6th Cir. 1989).
63. See CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. 4 9607(b) (1996).
64. See id.
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of causation as a necessary element for establishing a
generator's liability.65
2. Off-Site Transfers
Besides its liability scheme, CERCLA establishes an
extensive array of mechanisms designed to ensure that
each response activity is carried out in a safe and effec-
tive manner. Recognizing the futility of transferring
remediated material to a facility where a future release
could occur, legislators incorporated section 121 into
CERCLA.66
Section 121 ensures that facilities receiving hazardous
substances from CERCLA sites are properly maintained
and are functionally capable of managing such materi-
als. Section 121 establishes that persons conducting
response actions can only transfer remediated waste
65. The majority of courts do not require a plaintiff to
establish a causal link between the defendant's waste and
the incurrence of response costs. See, e.g., U.S. v. Wade, 577
F. Supp. 1326, 1333-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that a
plaintiff must only establish that: (1) the generator shipped
hazardous substances to the facility; (2) hazardous sub-
stances like those of the generator, are present at the facility;
(3) there is a release, or threat of release of hazardous sub-
stances at the facility; and (4) response costs were incurred
in response to the threat of contamination). But see City of
New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y 1986)
(requiring proof of a causal link between the defendant's
waste and the incurrence of response costs in order to re-
cover response expenditures).
66. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, OFFICE
OF ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDANCE, RCRA/CERCLA DIVISION (EH-
231), TRANSPORTING CERCLA WASTES OFF-SITE; FINAL OFF-
SITE RULE 1 (December 1994) (discussing how § 121 of
CERCLA aims to prevent remediated materials from contrib-
uting to environmental problems at off-site waste manage-
ment facilities); Procedures for Implementing Off-Site Re-
sponse Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49201 (September 22, 1993); see
also CERCLA § 121, 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1996).
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materials to off-site locations that comply with applica-
ble operating standards and corrective action plans.67
EPA's Off-Site Rule ("OSR")68 provides regulations for
section 121 and affects response actions conducted by
Federal agencies, States, and private parties. 69 Under
the OSR, a facility may receive wastes from off-site loca-
tions provided there are no relevant violations at the re-
ceiving unit. 70
67. In order to qualify as an approved off-site location:
(1) the facility must comply with applicable RCRA permit re-
quirements; (2) the unit to which the CERCLA waste is being
transferred (the "receiving unit") may not be releasing any
hazardous waste or hazardous waste constituent, into the
groundwater, surface water, or soil; and (3) if there are any
releases of hazardous wastes at the facility's nonreceiving
units, those releases must be controlled by an approved cor-
rective action program. See CERCLA. § 121(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. §
9621(d)(3) (1996).
68. See 58 Fed. Reg. 49200, 49200 (1993).
69. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.440(a)(1) (1996). Emergency
removal actions may be exempt from complying with the re-
quirements outlined in the OSR. See 40 C.F.R. §
300.440(a)(2). Such exceptions are generally limited to
situations presenting an immediate and significant threat to
human health and the environment. See id.
70. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.440(b) (1996). Relevant viola-
tions include significant deviations from. requirements de-
signed to prevent contamination or compel corrective action
including: criminal indictments; violations of sections 3004
or 3005 of RCRA; violations of State environmental laws; or
failure to comply with minimum technology requirements.
See id. In evaluating the relevance of a violation, EPA con-
siders factors such as whether the violation occurred at a
receiving unit; the type of facility where the violation oc-
curred; and the degree of threat to human health and the
environment. See 58 Fed. Reg. 49200, 49208 (1993).
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3. The Significance and Effect of CERCLA on the
. Export of Hazardous Wastes
CERCLA looms as a potential disaster for generators
disposing hazardous waste in the United States.
CERCLA's liability scheme is so draconian that a gen-
erator may seek to export hazardous wastes, in part, as
a means of reducing litigation concerns. 71 After becom-
ing subject to a CERCLA response action, the generator
must then ensure that its cleanup activities comply with
the OSR. Beyond the legal and regulatory challenges
associated with this requirement, there may be public
opposition to the receipt of wastes from outside loca-
tions.72 This opposition can require additional time, re-
sources, and also may generate unfavorable media cov-
erage. 73
71. CERCLA liability has been described as "a black
hole that indiscriminately devours all who come near it."
Long Beach Unified School Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cali-
fornia Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir. 1994),
quoting, Jerry L. Anderson, The Hazardous Waste Land, 13
VA. ENVTL. L.J., 1, 6-7 (1993).
72. See, e.g., Navy Tries Again to Dispose of Napalm,
CNN INTERACTIVE, U.S. NEWS, May 15, 1998, available at
<http://www.cnn.com/us/index/html.> (describing how a
disposal facility, subject to the OSR, refused to honor a dis-
posal contract because of public and political opposition to
the intended disposal plan).
73. See id. (demonstrating that public opposition may
force generators to spend several weeks searching for alter-
native disposal facilities); State News, Louisiana, PESTICIDE &
Toxic CHEM. NEWS, Vol. 27, No. 11, at 13 (Jan. 7, 1999) (il-
lustrating the time and resources that companies may spend
in response to community and environmental groups' oppo-
sition campaigns); Marianne Lavelle, Environmental Vise:
Law, Compliance, NAT'L L.J., Vol. 15, No. 52, at S1-S2 (Aug.
30, 1993) (indicating that activists force companies to expend
additional resources on public relations activities and legal
defenses).
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A generator can, however, avoid some of these diffi-
culties by disposing hazardous waste outside the United
States. Although CERCLA's liability scheme causes
concern for domestic companies, CERCLA does not ap-
ply to releases in foreign countries even if the release
resulted from a hazardous substance exported from the
United States.7 4 Moreover, a receiving country may be
eager to accept waste from CERCLA sites, as opposed to
U.S. communities, which may resist the intended
transfer. In this respect, CERCLA and the OSR create
potential pitfalls which generators can avoid, to some
extent, through exportation. 75
C. The Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution
1. The Effects on Hazardous Waste Transportation and
Disposal
In addition to RCRA and CERCLA, the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution affects the
transportation and disposal of hazardous wastes gener-
ated in the United States. Unlike RCRA and CERCLA,
which restrict disposal options, the Commerce Clause
broadens domestic waste management opportunities.
By granting Congress the authority to regulate inter-
74. Compare CERCLA § 101(8), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8)
(1996) with CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1996)
(defining the terms "environment" and "release" in a manner
that limits PRPs' liability to releases into the navigable waters
or territories under the jurisdiction of the United States).
75. CERCLA § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 9608(c)(1996) (It should
be noted, however, that a U.S. generator would remain sub-
ject to CERCLA's liability scheme for releases that occurred
domestically).
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state commerce, the Commerce Clause limits States'
ability to restrict the importation of hazardous wastes. 76
Citizens frequently object to the establishment of a
disposal site within their communities, or to a local fa-
cility's receipt of wastes from other jurisdictions. 77 In
response to such objections, legislators have employed
various methods to restrict the importation of hazard-
ous wastes into local hazardous waste facilities.78 These
methods include increasing disposal fees, banning
waste importation, and adding permit requirements. 79
Generally, states and localities base their restrictions on
efforts designed to protect health, safety, and the envi-
ronment.80 The authority to enact such laws exists pur-
suant to the police powers reserved to states.,
76. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress
with the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
Indian Tribes and the states).
77. See supra note 10 (describing community opposition
to waste imports).
78. See, e.g., Donald Baker, In Virginia, Support Grows
for Landfill Restraints, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1998, at BI (de-
scribing efforts to restrict the importation of waste into the
State of Virginia).
79. See id. (discussing restrictions such as capping the
number of available permits for new landfills; curtailing wa-
terway transportation of interstate trash; limiting the expan-
sion of State landfill capacities; and imposing moratoriums
on the construction, growth, or operation of new landfills);
Kate Sinding, The Transboundary Movement of Waste: A Criti-
cal Comparison of U.S. Interstate Policy and the Emerging In-
ternational Regime, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 796, 814-17 (1996)
(describing restrictions proposed by state 'and local govern-
ments).
80. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353,
363 (1992) (arguing that proposed restrictions protected
health and safety); Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt,
504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992) (asserting that proposed restric-
tions served a legitimate local purpose related to citizens'
health and safety); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
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State and local laws limiting the interstate transpor-
tation of hazardous waste may be unconstitutional un-
der the Commerce Clause if such laws place unreason-
able restrictions on interstate commerce.8 2 In City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey,83 the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that states can not unduly restrict the
movement of interstate trade because waste constitutes
U.S. 617, 618-19 (1978) (describing a New Jersey proposal to
ban the importation of wastes originating from outside the
State as a means of furthering the state's health, safety, and
environmental objectives). States have frequently relied on
the fact that the Supreme Court has carved out an exception
to the Commerce Clause protection in situations where a
state law is necessary to quarantine against out-of-state arti-
cles. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986)
(upholding legislation which discriminated against out-of-
state commerce involving articles that were highly danger-
ous); National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama,
910 F.2d 713, 720 (11th Cir. 1990).
81. See Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S.
334, 347 (1992) (citing Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 443
(1879) for the proposition that through the use of its police
powers, a state may restrict activities which endanger the
health and safety of its citizens).
82. See C. & A. Carbone Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,
511 U.S. 383 (1994) (holding that a town's waste flow control
ordinance violated the Commerce Clause); Chemical Waste
Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992) (determining
that a state's economic barrier against out-of-state wastes
violated the Commerce Clause); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Land-
fill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S.
353, 367 (1992) (finding "no health and safety reason for
limiting the amount of waste that a landfill operator may ac-
cept from outside the state, but not the amount that the op-
erator may accept from inside the state"); City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (criticizing an at-
tempt by the state to isolate itself from a common problem by
erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade).
83. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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an article of commerce.8 4 This reasoning has served as
precedent for several other decisions.8 5
2. Limitations on Commerce Clause Protection
Despite the legal protection afforded by the Commerce
Clause, states and localities may still employ a variety of
measures to restrict the import of hazardous waste.
Each of these measures raises the costs and regulatory
burdens associated with domestic movement and dis-
posal of hazardous wastes, and provides further incen-
tive for generators to export hazardous wastes outside
the United States. States and localities may limit waste
imports when the need for the limitation outweighs po-
tential infringement on interstate commerce. 6 State
and local governments may also impose additional re-
strictions on wastes originating from out-of-state
sources, if the government is participating in the waste
disposal market as a private party.8 7 In other words,
84. See id. at 621-23.
85. See, e.g., C. & A. Carbone Inc. v. Town of Clark-
stown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994); Fort Gratiot Landfill v.
Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359
(1992); National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama,
910 F.2d 713, 718 (11 th Cir. 1990).
86. See Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metro. Serv. Dist.,
643 F. Supp. 127, 129 (D. Or. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1482
(9th Cir. 1987) (upholding a ban on waste importation as a
means of extending the operational life of the landfill); Glass-
boro v. Gloucester County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 495
A.2d 49, 55 (N.J. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1008 (1985)
(barring importation of wastes to protect the health, safety,
and welfare of citizens whose municipalities lack alternative
means of disposing waste).
87. See Waste Recycling v. S.E. Alabama Solid Waste
Disposal, 814 F. Supp. 1566, 1571 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (provid-
ing that if a state or local government acts as a market par-
ticipant rather than a market regulator, the government's
conduct is not subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny);
Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 351
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when a hazardous waste facility is owned or subsidized
by the government, the Commerce Clause provides
fewer protections against regulation than if the govern-
ment were regulating a private facility.88 States can also
tax hazardous waste transportation in ways that inordi-
nately impact out-of-state generators. 89
In addition to these impositions, there have also been
several legislative efforts to expand states' and localities'
ability to impose regulations on wastes originating from
other jurisdictions. 90 Supporters of increased restric-
(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that a State may
favor local industries when the state is acting as a market
participant); White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Em-
ployers, 460 U.S. 204, 206-208 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429, 436-439 (1980).
88. See Waste Recycling v. S.E. Alabama Solid Waste
Disposal, 814 F. Supp. 1566, 1572 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (noting
the different levels of legal scrutiny that apply depending on
whether the State is acting as a market participant or as a
regulator); Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883
F.2d 245, 248-51 (3d Cir. 1989) (analyzing the market par-
ticipant theory in the waste disposal context).
89. See Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S.
334, 350-51 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting the
variety of constitutionally-protected measures that a State
can use against out-of-state transporters of hazardous
waste). For example, a tax based on the amount of mileage
traveled could be imposed on all vehicles which transport
hazardous wastes within the State. See id. Such a tax
structure would disproportionately impact out-of-state
transporters who generally would need to travel greater dis-
tances to reach a particular disposal site.
90. See, e.g., STATE CONTROL OF MANAGEMENT OF
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE, H.R. 2848, 103d Cong. (1993)
(authorizing States to establish import restrictions, landfill
tonnage limitations, and bans on the importation of wastes
for disposal); S. 2877, 102d Cong. § 2 (1992) (authorizing
bans on the importation of out-of-state wastes for disposal);
House Panel Circulates Draft Bill Supporting Local Control
Laws, NAT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA), at D-5. (Feb 23, 1994); Solid
Waste: Efforts Underway to Push Interstate Flow Control Bills
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tions assert that because waste management is an ac-
tivity protected by the principles of federalism, local
governments should regulate their own waste disposal
practices. 91 For all these reasons, although the Com-
merce Clause provides some protection against restric-
tions on the transportation and disposal of hazardous
wastes in the United States, there are still several fac-
tors that lead U.S. generators to export their hazardous
wastes to foreign countries.
II. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AFFECTING THE
TRANSABOUNDARY MOVEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTES
In addition to the domestic requirements influencing a
generator's decision to export hazardous wastes, there
are several international agreements that affect this
trade practice. Since the United States is the world's
leading generator and exporter of hazardous waste, 92
many generators have determined that compliance with
the international agreements is more advantageous than
compliance with domestic requirements. Part II identi-
fies and analyzes the most significant international
agreements affecting the export of hazardous wastes.
in Lame Duck Sessions, NAT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA), at D-5 (Oct.
28, 1994).
91. See Michael D. Diederich, Jr., Does Garbage Have
Standing: Democracy, Flow Control and a Principled Approach
to Municipal Solid Waste Management, 11 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
157 (1993) (arguing that State and local governments should
have greater discretion to restrict the importation of waste).
92. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 1, at 13-14. It
is estimated that during the late 1980's, all the countries
within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) generated 300 million tons of hazardous
waste. See id. The United States accounted for almost
eighty-six percent of that total. See id. See also Ban Sought
on Toxic Exports; Clinton Administration Seeks Congressional
Legislation to Ban Toxic Waste Shipments AMERICAN METAL
MARKET (March 8, 1994) available in LEXIS (describing the
amount of hazardous wastes exported by the United States).
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A. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
1. Background and Overview of the Basel Convention
The Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal ("Basel Convention")93 is a multi-national
agreement that regulates the transportation of hazard-
ous wastes across international borders. The key ob-
jective of the Basel Convention is to protect human
health and the environment by minimizing the genera-
tion and transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes. 94 Hazardous wastes regulated by the Conven-
tion include wastes exhibiting hazardous characteris-
tics, as well as specifically identified wastes. 95 The Basel
Convention represents the most significant and influen-
tial international agreement impacting the hazardous
waste trade.96
93. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, opened
for signature Mar. 22, 1989, S. TREATY Doc. No. 5, 102d
Cong., 28 I.L.M. 657 [hereinafter Basel Convention]. The
Convention was sponsored by the United Nations Environ-
mental Program (UNEP) and entered into force on May 5,
1992. See id.
94. See id. at art. 4.
95. See id. at art. 1, para. (1)(a). Wastes outside this
definition may still be regulated under the Basel Convention
if an exporting nation, importing nation, or transit nation
considers the waste to be hazardous. See id. at art. 1, para.
(1)(b). See also Jason L. Gudofsky, Transboundary Ship-
ments of Hazardous Waste for Recycling and Recovery Opera-
tions, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 219, 234-36 (1998) (providing de-
tailed discussion of hazardous wastes regulated under the
Basel Convention).
96. See MOSTAFA K. TOLBA, Preface to TRANSBOUNDARY
MOVEMENTS AND DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, BASIC DOCUMENTS XIII (Barbara Kwiat-
kowska & Alfred H. A. Soons eds., 1993). On June 17, 1999,
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The Basel Convention requires that exporters notify
receiving countries of intended hazardous waste ship-
ments.97  The notification must identify all nations
through which the waste will travel. 98 The receiving na-
tion may consent to the request, reject the offer, solicit
additional information, or accept the request with
stipulated conditions. 99 All waste shipments are pro-
hibited until the exporter obtains both a proper consent
and a disposal contract that provides for "environmen-
tally sound management" of the wastes. 0 0 No party may
engage in the importation or exportation of wastes with
nonparty States unless a separate disposal agreement
that satisfies the environmentally sound management
standard has been established.10' Any violation of these
there were 123 parties to the Basel Convention. See Request
for Information Concerning Transfrontier Movement of
Wastes Destined for Recovery Operations Within the OECD
Area, 64 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (1999). Countries that have
adopted the Basel Convention include: Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Mexico, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, India,
Argentina, the United Kingdom and China. See Secretariat of
the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Basel
Convention: Status of Ratifications (visited April 19, 2000)
<http://www.basel.int/ratif.html> (offering a complete list of
the parties to the Basel Convention as of March 2, 2000).
97. See Basel Convention, supra note 93, at art. 6(1).
98. See id; see also id. at Annex V(A), para. 7.
99. See id. at art. 6(2).
100. See id. at art. 6(3). "Environmentally sound man-
agement" means taking all practicable steps to ensure that
the wastes are managed in a manner protective of human
health and the environment. See id. at art. 2(8). Commen-
tators have criticized the standard for being vague and sub-
jective. See, e.g., David J. Abrams, Regulating the Interna-
tional Hazardous Waste Trade: A Proposed Global Solution, 28
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 827-31 (1990).
101. See Basel Convention, supra note 93, at art. 4(5).
See also id. at art. 11(1) (discussing the establishment of
separate disposal agreements). The United States has en-
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prohibitions requires the exporting State to recover its
wastes from the receiving country.102
In addition to the requirements included within the
original Basel Convention, the parties have proposed an
amendment ("Decision III/1") prohibiting countries
within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD")103 from exporting hazardous
wastes to non-OECD countries. 04 The purpose of the
amendment is to increase safe disposal practices and
reduce the generation of hazardous wastes by forcing
OECD countries to retain their own waste materials.10 5
tered into such a separate agreement with Malaysia, and
there are ongoing efforts to adopt similar agreements with
Brazil, the Philippines, and Singapore. See, e.g., Administra-
tion Considering Bilaterals to Let Basel Parties Export Waste to
U.S., INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA), Vol. 19, No. 8, at 305 (April 17,
1996). Supporters of such agreements assert that the ex-
portation of hazardous wastes provides for safer and less ex-
pensive disposal practices. See, e.g., id. Environmental
groups have raised concerns, however, that these agreements
may be used to circumvent any ban on waste shipments.
See Basel Convention Parties to Discuss Possible Exceptions to
Waste Trade Ban, INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA), Vol. 21, No. 3, at 87
(Feb. 4, 1998).
102. See Basel Convention, supra note 93, at art. 8.
103. The OECD is an intergovernmental organization
consisting of twenty-nine industrialized countries from
Europe, North America, Asia, and the Pacific. Member
countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. See Hazardous Wastes: EPA Seeks No Com-
ment on Rule Codifying OECD Decision on Hazardous Waste
Trade, INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA), Vol. 19, No. 8, at 311, 312
(April 17, 1996).
104. See Decisions Adopted by the Third Meeting of the
Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention, at 1, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/CHW.3/35 (1995) [hereinafter Decision I!1].
105. See id. Cf. United Nations Officials See Basel
Treaty as 'Limping" Into Effect With Limited Support, INT'L
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Despite being proposed in 1994, the ban is not yet
binding because' of insufficient acceptance among Basel
Convention members. 06 However, recent modifications
to the proposal have increased support for the amend-
ment. 107
2. United States' Position on the Basel Convention
Despite signing the Basel Convention in 1990, the
United States has yet to ratify the international agree-
ment.108 Accordingly, the requirements of the Basel
Convention do not currently apply to the United States.
Part of the reason for the delay is that the United States
lacks the regulatory infrastructure necessary to imple-
ENV'T REP. (BNA), at 275 (May 6, 1992). See Report of the
First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Con-
vention, at 2, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHW.1/24 (1992) (indicating
that this amendment would require approximately 95 percent
of the 300-400 million metric tons of hazardous waste gener-
ated worldwide be disposed of within OECD countries).
106. See Parties to Basel Convention Adopt Two-List Sys-
tem for OECD Waste Exports, INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA), Vol. 21,
No. 5, at 185 (Mar. 4, 1998).
107. See Industry Groups Say They Would Support Basel
Legislation Under, Certain Conditions, INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA),
Vol. 21, No. 12, at 567 (June 10, 1998). Under the revised
system, waste materials identified on List A (Annex VIII)
would be subject- to the ban on exportation from OECD to
non-OECD countries, and wastes on List B (Annex IX) could
be exported from OECD to non-OECD countries unless the
waste exhibited hazardous characteristics. See id. Materials
on List A include arsenic, asbestos, lead, and mercury; while
materials on List B include scrap iron, steel, copper, and
used paper. See Parties to Basel Convention Adopt Two-List
System for OECD Waste Exports, INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA), Vol.
21, No. 5, at 185 (Mar. 4, 1998).
108. See EPA Faulted for Grabbing Too Much Power Un-
der Draft Basel Convention Legislation, CHEM. REG. REP.
(BNA), Vol. 23, No. 1, at 24 (April 22, 1999).
HAZARDOUS WASTES
ment the Basel Convention.10 9 There are, however, on-
going efforts to facilitate ratification of the agreement. 110
The Executive Branch recently released a proposal for
inter-agency comment that would provide EPA with the
authority to fulfill U.S. responsibilities under the Basel
Convention."' In particular, the legislation would
authorize EPA to prevent any waste exportation that
was incompatible with the environmentally sound man-
agement standard."12 Although the draft has not been
publicly circulated, critics have already objected to the
amount of discretionary authority provided to EPA."13
Moreover, previous efforts to revise hazardous waste ex-
portation requirements have failed." 4
Beyond these obstacles, it is especially difficult to rat-
ify the Basel Convention because of the recently pro-
posed amendment that prohibits OECD countries from
exporting hazardous waste to non-OECD countries.
Opponents claim the prohibition violates principles of
free trade," 5 and would increase the use of virgin re-
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id. It is expected that the legislation will be
submitted to Congress during 1999.
112. See id.
113. See id. (asserting that the draft does not provide
for judicial review of EPA decisions on waste exportation and
places too many constraints on imported waste destined for
recycling).
114. See, e.g., Louis Freedberg, U.S. Plans Ban on Ex-
ports of Hazardous Waste, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 26, 1994, at A4
(reporting that in 1994, the Clinton Administration proposed
to immediately prohibit all hazardous waste exports to devel-
oping nations, and phase out the exportation of hazardous
waste to OECD nations over a five-year period). The proposal
would have also established the regulatory infrastructure
that must exist before the United States can ratify the Con-
vention.
115. See Morgan E. Goodwin, Chamber Reverses Basel
Position; U.S. Chamber of Commerce No Longer Endorses
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sources. 116 Opponents also assert that because Decision
III/I is an amendment to the Basel Convention, a sepa-
rate ratification from the U.S. Senate is required. 117 In
contrast, proponents favoring the :adoption of the Basel
Convention and Decision 111/1 claim that failure to ratify
the Convention prevents U.S. facilities from trading with
treaty members" 8 and compromises U.S. efforts to influ-
ence the substance of the Basel Convention." 9 In light
of these controversies, it is difficult to propose legisla-
tion that fulfills requirements necessary for implemen-
tation of the Basel Convention and Decision Ill/1, yet it
does not encounter enough opposition to impede pas-
sage of the proposal. 120
Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste Transportation and
Disposal, AM. METAL MARKET, June 1, 1994 at 9.
116. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste: Basel Convention Ban
on OECD Exports Hinges on Definition of Recycled Waste, INT'L
DAILY (BNA), at D-3 (Sept. 20, 1995).
117. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste: Attempts to Implement
Basel Treaty Delayed by Administration Conflicts, INT'L ENV'T
REP. (BNA), Vol. 21, No. 13, at 621-622 (June 24, 1998).
118. See, e.g., Amy Porter, Hazardous Waste: Admini-
stration Commits to Begin Process of Implementing Basel Early
Next.Year, INTERNATIONAL ENv'T. REP. (BNA), Vol. 21, No. 18,
at 849 (Sep. 2, 1998) (describing how Barbara Larkin, Assis-
tant Secretary for Legislative Affairs at the U.S. State De-
partment, indicated that failure to sign the treaty hinders
U.S. commercial efforts). But see Basel Convention, supra
note 93, at art. 11 (authorizing the establishment of separate
trading agreements). In this respect, even with the ratifica-
tion of Decision III/ 1, it may be possible that parties could
negotiate bilateral agreements to circumvent the export re-
strictions.
119. See, e.g., Official Says U.S. Should Ratify Treaty on
Hazardous Waste Movement Despite Flaws, INT'L ENV'T REP.
(BNA), Vol. 19, No. 6, at 211 (Mar. 20; 1996).
120. In addition to objections associated with measures
necessary to implement the Basel Convention, critics have
also raised concerns that the legislation may be used as a
vehicle to address other environmental issues such as reme-
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B. La Paz Agreement
On February 16, 1984, the Agreement on Cooperation
for the Protection and the Improvement of the Environ-
ment in the Border Area ("La Paz Agreement") went into
effect between the United States and Mexico. 121 In part,
the Agreement aims to reduce risks to public health,
property, and the environment associated with hazard-
ous wastes. 122 Annex III of the La Paz Agreement estab-
lishes notification procedures for the transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes. 123 The procedures re-
quire that before any hazardous waste crosses the bor-
der between the United States and Mexico, the receiving
country must consent to the import.124 The exporting
country must notify the receiving country at least forty-
five days prior to the intended shipment. 125 This notifi-
cation must identify the exporter, the type and quantity
of waste, the exportation schedule and the point of en-
try.126 Moreover, the exporting country must accept any
hazardous waste returned by the importing country. 127
Annex III also requires each country to ensure that its
domestic environmental laws and regulations are fully
diation or interstate waste problems. See, e.g.,. Amy Porter,
United States Commits to Begin Process of Implementing Basel
Early Next Year, INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA), Vol. 21, No. 18, at
848, 849 (1998).
121. See Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection
and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area,
Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10,827, 22 I.L.M. 1025
- 26 [hereinafter La Paz Agreement].
122. See id. at Annex III, Preamble. Article I broadly
defines "hazardous wastes" as any waste which may result in
damage to health or the environment, and which is identified
pursuant to the policies, laws, or regulations of each national
authority. See id. at art. I, para. 1.




127. See La Pas Agreement, supra note 121 at art. IV.
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enforced.118 To substantiate this mandate, the Agree-
ment requires the parties exchange monitoring and en-
forcement-related information associated with trans-
boundary waste shipments. 129
C. The North American Free Trade Agreement
The North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") 3 0 aims to promote free trade, investment, and
the movement of goods and services between Canada,
Mexico, and the United States.131 During the develop-
ment of NAFTA, critics speculated that countries might
seek to attract investment by relaxing environmental
standards. 132  To address this concern, negotiators
added a variety of environmental protection measures
that impact the transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes.133
128. See id. at art. II.
129. See id. at art. XII, paras. 2-3. The La Paz Agree-
ment promotes the enforcement of hazardous waste import
and export requirements through information exchanges, the
provision of documents, and on-site visits to treatment, stor-
age, and disposal facilities.
130. North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted
Aug. 12, 1992, revised Sept. 6, 1993, U.S.-Mex.-Can., 32
I.L.M. 289 (pts. 1-3) & 32 I.L.M. 605 (pts. 4-8 & annexes)
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
131. See id. at art. 102 (stating that NAFTA's objectives
include eliminating trade barriers; facilitating the cross-
border movement of goods and services; promoting fair com-
petition in the free trade area; and increasing investment op-
portunities).
132. See Tim Golden, A History of Pollution in Mexico
Casts Clouds Over Trade Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993,
at Al, A7 (describing concerns that Mexico might become a
"pollution haven" for foreign investors).
133. The adequacy of NAFTA's environmental protection
mechanisms remains a controversy, especially in light of the
increased industrial activity resulting from NAFTA's enact-
ment. See, e.g., NAFTA and the Environment, supra note 3, at
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NAFTA's Preamble requires each nation to pursue
trade objectives in a manner consistent with environ-
mental protection and conservation. 34 In keeping with
this requirement, Article 1114 prohibits the relaxation
or waiver of environmental standards in order to attract
foreign investment.13 5 Moreover, the text establishes pro-
cedures to address perceived violations of this prohibi-
tion.136 Article 1114 is relevant to the transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes because the trade prac-
tice is heavily influenced by regulatory burdens and
compliance costs. 13 7
Article 104 of NAFTA incorporates the requirements of
two other international agreements. Article 104 states
that where NAFTA conflicts with either the La Paz
Agreement or the Basel Convention, the provisions of
the La Paz Agreement or the Basel Convention shall
762 (asserting that because authorities will be unable to ad-
dress the increased generation of hazardous wastes resulting
from NAFTA's implementation, the southwestern border re-
gion exists on "the cusp of an environmental disaster");
James A. Duffy, The Environmental Implications of a North
American Free Trade Agreement, 10 HoFSTRA LAB. L.J. 561,
562 (1993) (asserting that NAFTA's enactment will allow the
United States to take advantage of Mexico's less stringent
environmental regulations). But see Steve Charnovitz, The
NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for Envi-
ronmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treaty-
making, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 257, 289 (1994) (charac-
terizing NAFTA as the first trade agreement to address envi-
ronmental standards in a serious fashion).
134. NAFTA, supra note 130, at preamble.
135. See id. at art. 1114(2) (prohibiting parties from en-
couraging investment by relaxing domestic health, safety, or
environmental measures).
136. See id. (establishing a consultation process to ad-
dress situations where a party may have waived environ-
mental standards in an effort to attract investment).
137. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describ-
ing how regulatory burdens and disposal costs affect the
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes).
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govern. 138 When there is a choice between complying
with the La Paz Agreement and the Basel Convention,
countries shall coinply with the choice that is most con-
sistent with the provisions of NAFTA. 139
NAFTA resulted in the establishment of a supplemen-
tary accord called the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation ("Side Agreement")140 which
aims to improve environmentally related compliance and
enforcement efforts.'4' As part of the Side Agreement,
the parties agreed to enforce environmental require-
ments through such measures as the adoption of re-
porting and compliance programs; publicizing noncom-
pliance data; communicating enforcement efforts; and
penalizing violations of environmental requirements. 42
The Side Agreement also established a Commission on
Environmental Cooperation ("CEC") which serves as a
forum on environmental issues.4 3 Any person or or-
ganization of a member nation may petition the CEC to
review an alleged violation of NAFTA's environmental
138. NAFTA; supra note 130, at art. 104(l).
139. See id.
140. North American Agreement on Environmental Co-
operation, opened for signature Sept. 9, 1993, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
141. The objectives of the Side Agreement include: (1)
promoting sustainable development through mutually sup-
portive environmental policies; (2) increasing cooperation
among signatory nations to conserve, protect, and enhance
the environment; (3) supporting the environmental goals and
objectives of NAFTA; (4) strengthening cooperation on the de-
velopment and improvement of environmental laws, regula-
tions, and policies; (5) enhancing compliance with, and the
enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations; and (6)
promoting pollution prevention. See id. at art. l(b)-U).
142. See id. at art. 5(1). In determining the penalties
for environmental violations, the parties must consider the
nature and gravity of the violation, the cleanup costs in-
volved, and the economic benefit obtained by the violator.
See id. at art. 5(3).
143. See id. at art. 8(1).
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obligations. 44 In October 1998, the CEC received its
first request to review an enforcement matter involving
hazardous waste disposal. 145 The petitioners hoped that
the petition would serve as an example for addressing
other environmental issues covered under the Side
Agreement. 146
D. Convention on the Protection of the Environment
Through Criminal Law
On November 16, 1998, the Council of Europe ("CoE")
announced the signing of the Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Environment Through Criminal Law ("CoE
Convention"). 147 Once entered into force, the Convention
will establish a severe penalty system for environmental
transgressions associated with the transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes. Articles 2 and 3 of the
Convention criminalize the unlawful transportation of
hazardous waste that is likely to cause serious human
144. See id. at art. 14(1)(0. In order for the CEC to pro-
cess the petition, the submission must: provide sufficient
documentation to support any claim; identify the person or
organization submitting the petition; and serve a purpose
other than harassment. See id.
145. See Carolyn Whetzel, Groups Seek NAFTA Body
Assistance in Cleaning Up Abandoned Plant in Mexico, CHEM.
REG. REP. (BNA), Vol. 22, No. 30, at 1205 (Oct. 30, 1998).
The request petitioned the CEC to review Mexico's lack of
enforcement against an abandoned recycling plant. See id. at
1204.
146. See, e.g., id. at 1205.
147. Convention on the Protection of the Environment
Through Criminal Law, Council of Europe (Nov. 1998) No.
172 [hereinafter "CoE Convention"]. The treaty will enter into
force once three more nations ratify the agreement. See also
Seven Nations Sign Council of Europe Treaty Criminalizing
Acts Harmful to Environment, INT'L ENv. (BNA), Vol. 21, No.
24, at 1156 (Nov. 25, 1998). The seven countries that have
already signed the agreement are Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, and Sweden. See id.
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injury or environmental damage. 148 The Convention re-
quires that signatories be able to impose imprisonment
and financial sanctions for the most serious environ-
mental offenses. 149 This Convention also requires that
the signatories cooperate in criminal investigations and
judicial proceedings. 5 0 The Convention allows for both
corporate and individual liability.' 5' By reason of its
criminal penalties, this Convention represents one of
the most stringent international agreements on envi-
ronmental issues. 52
The jurisdictional reach of the CoE Convention applies
beyond each signatory's national territory. Article 5
provides that offenses committed on a ship or aircraft
are subject to the Convention's requirements, even if the
offense occurred outside a signatory's territorial juris-
148. See CoE Convention, supra note 147, at art.
2(1)(c). Article 2 specifically provides that each party shall
criminalize, "the unlawful disposal, treatment, storage,
transport or import of hazardous waste which causes or is
likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or sub-
stantial damage to the quality of air, soil, water, animals or
plants.. .when committed intentionally." Id. Article 3 estab-
lishes that the offenses identified in Article 2 are also crimi-
nal offenses even when committed with negligence, but there
are available reservations on this requirement. See id. at art.
3.
149. See id. at art. 6. Criminal sanctions may also in-
clude reinstatement of the environment. See id.
150. See id. at art. 12. Article 12 provides that the par-
ties shall afford each other "the widest measure of co-
operation in investigations and judicial proceedings relating
to criminal offenses. . . ." Id.
151. See id. at art. 9.
152. See Seven Nations Sign Council of Europe Treaty
Criminalizing Acts Harmful to Environment, 21 INT'L ENv.
(BNA), Vol. 21, No. 24, at 1155 (Nov. 25, 1998) (describing
how the CoE Convention imposes significant new penalties
that criminalize actions likely to cause environmental dam-
age).
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diction. 153 The CoE Convention also permits signatory
nations to adopt more stringent regulations through the
ratification of additional agreements. 54
E. Regional Agreements of Developing Countries
There are also two leading regional agreements that
address perceived shortcomings of international hazard-
ous waste trading oversight. In March of 1990, African,
Caribbean, and Pacific ("ACP") States 5 established the
"Lome Convention" 56 out of concern that the existing
international requirements regulating the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous wastes inadequately
protected the interests of developing countries. 157 To
address these concerns, the Lome Convention estab-
lishes several areas of cooperation between ACP States
153. See CoE Convention, supra note 147, at art. 5. A
signatory state can, however, enter a reservation on this pro-
vision. See id.
154. See id. at art. 16.
155. ACP States include sixty-nine former European
colonies located in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific.
See The Fourth African, Caribbean, and Pacific States-
European Economic Community Convention of Lome, opened
for signature, March 22, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990) at 26.1
(listing countries that ratified the Lome Convention) [herein-
after Lome Convention].
156. See id.
157. See Resolutions of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly,
Resolution on the Banning of Exports of Toxic Wastes From
Community Member States to the ACP, C 186/47, at 27.3 F
(January 27, 1989) (stating that the Basel Convention inade-
quately responds to the demands of the ACP States for con-
trolling the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes
and prohibiting the dumping of hazardous wastes within ACP
States); see also Kurt M. Rozelsky, European Economic Com-
munities-Environmental Policy-Legal Basis and International
Implications of Council Regulation on the Supervision and Con-
trol of Shipments of Hazardous Waste, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 111, 129 (1993).
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and nations within the European Economic Community
("EEC") regarding the transboundary movement of haz-
ardous wastes. Article 39 of the Lome Convention pro-
hibits ACP States from importing hazardous wastes
from any country, and imposes an affirmative obligation
on EEC countries to prohibit all exports of hazardous
waste to ACP States. 158 Article 39 requires signatory
nations to expedite the enactment of internal legislation
and administrative regulations to complete these man-
dates. 159 The Lome Convention also created a consulta-
tion process to address noncompliant activities 160 and
supports the ratification of the Basel Convention. 6 '
Another international agreement initiated by develop-
ing countries is the Bamako Convention. 62 Like the
Lome Convention, the Bamako Convention takes a strict
approach toward limiting the transboundary movement
of hazardous wastes. The Bamako Convention estab-
lishes a notification process to provide for accountability
and informed consent during waste transfers. 63 Each
signatory must prevent the exportation of hazardous
waste for disposal unless the intended transport and
158. See Lome Convention, supra note 155, at art. 39(1)-
(3).
159. See id.
160. See id. at art. 39(l)-(2) (establishing that each
party may initiate consultations to address delays in imple-
mentation or noncompliance with the requirements of the
Lome Convention). The potential outcomes of the consulta-
tion process are quite broad, allowing members to take "ap-
propriate steps in light of the situation." Id. at art. 39(1).
161. See id. at Annex IX.
162. Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into
Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and
Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, opened for
signature January 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773 (1991) [hereinafter
Bamako Convention].
163. See id. at art. 6. Article 6 also requires members
to limit the points of entry that may be used in the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous wastes. See id.
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disposal methods would be performed in an environ-
mentally sound manner.6 4 The convention criminalizes
the importation of hazardous waste into Africa,165 and
severely restricts the movement of hazardous wastes al-
ready located within Africa.166 The Bamako Convention
also establishes a wide scope of applicability by broadly
defining the hazardous wastes subject to its require-
ments. 167  Hazardous wastes within this regulatory
scheme should be disposed of within the country of gen-
eration. 168 The Bamako Convention adopts the view that
164. See id. at art. 4(3)(h)-(k). This "environmentally
sound management" standard is the same standard used
within the Basel Convention. Compare id. at art. 1(10) with
Basel Convention, supra note 93, at art. 2(8).
165. See Bamako Convention, supra note 162, at art.
4(1).
166. See id. at art. 4(3) (requiring each signatory to: (1)
submit annual hazardous waste reports for auditing; (2) pre-
vent the export of hazardous wastes to countries which have
prohibited such imports; (3) ban the exportation of hazard-
ous wastes to countries which lack facilities necessary to en-
sure that the waste is disposed of in an environmentally
sound manner; and (4) adopt the precautionary approach to
pollution problems). The precautionary principle entails
"preventing the release into the environment of substances
which may cause harm to humans or the environment with-
out waiting for scientific proof regarding such harm." Id. at
art. 4(3)(f).
167. See id. at art. 2 (defining "hazardous wastes" to
include: wastes specifically listed within Annex I of the con-
vention; wastes possessing the characteristics of being haz-
ardous (i.e., explosive, flammable, corrosive, toxic, etc.); and
wastes which are specifically identified as hazardous by the
domestic legislation of a State of export, import, or transit).
See also id. at Annex II (describing the criteria for identifying
a hazardous waste). See also Jason L. Gudofsky, Tans-
boundary Shipments of Hazardous Waste for Recycling and
Recovery Operations, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 219, 247-250, 272
(1998) (providing a detailed discussion of hazardous wastes
regulated under the Bamako Convention).
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restricting the transportation of hazardous wastes helps
minimize the generation of such material.169 The Ba-
mako Convention imposes strict, joint and several li-
ability on hazardous waste generators, 170 and the term
"generator" is liberally construed. 171 Finally, the Ba-
mako Convention requires each signatory to designate a
national body to coordinate and oversee issues related
to international waste trading.172
F. Implications of the International Agreements
Analysis of the international agreements governing the
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes reveals
several trends. First, there is a growing interest in
regulating the transport of hazardous wastes across in-
ternational borders. Moreover, both industrialized and
developing nations have initiated or supported new re-
strictions. 173 These facts reveal that there is a globally
diverse perception that the oversight of hazardous waste
trading practices must be amended. Second, the re-
quirements established within these agreements are in-
168. See Bamako Convention, supra note 162, at pre-
amble, para. 8.
169. See id. at para. 9.
170. See id. at art. 4(3)(b) (imposing unlimited strict,
joint and several liability on hazardous waste generators for
wastes generated in Africa). The Bamako Convention also
provides broad latitude to impose damages on generators,
including the imposition of damages to punish and deter ille-
gal waste trafficking. See id. at art. 9(2).
171. The term "generator" means any person whose ac-
tivity produces hazardous wastes, or if that person is not
known, the person who is in possession and/or control of
those wastes. See id. at art. 1(20).
172. See id. at art. 5(4) (requiring each member state to
appoint a national body to coordinate governmental and non-
governmental bodies).
173. See, e.g., supra notes 93-172 and accompanying
text (describing international agreements initiated or sup-
ported by industrialized and developing countries).
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creasingly restrictive toward the transboundary move-
ment of hazardous wastes. The restrictions apply to a
greater variety of wastes, 174 and the jurisdictional reach
of these agreements has expanded. 175 Third, not only is
there a perceived need to increase the oversight of haz-
ardous waste trading, but there is also a perception held
by some parties that the transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes should be discouraged or completely
prohibited. 176 Fourth, the penalties for violations are be-
coming more severe. There are substantial criminal
penalties for parties who violate hazardous waste trad-
ing requirements, 177 and waste generators may be sub-
ject to strict, joint and several liability. 178  Notwith-
standing the United States' lack of participation in most
of these international agreements, the mere existence of
these agreements is significant to U.S. interests because
the international community is taking a more aggressive
174. See, e.g., Bamako Convention, supra note 162, at
arts. 2-3 (using a definition of "hazardous waste" that may
include wastes intended for recycling). This definition closes
a regulatory loophole that has been used to circumvent haz-
ardous waste importation restrictions. See Russell H.
Shearer, Comparative Analysis of the Basel and Bamako Con-
ventions on Hazardous Waste, 23 ENVT'L L. 141, 155 (1993).
175. See, e.g., CoE Convention, supra note 147 and ac-
companying text (describing how the jurisdiction of the CoE
Convention applies beyond a signatory's territorial borders).
176. See, e.g., supra note 158 and accompanying text
(describing how the Lome Convention bans the importation of
hazardous waste into Africa); Basel Convention, supra note
93, at preamble (supporting a prohibition on the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous wastes, and the disposal
of hazardous wastes in developing nations).
177. See CoE Convention, supra note 147, at art. 2 (de-
scribing criminal penalties for environmental offenses); Ba-
mako Convention supra note 162, at art. 4(1) (criminalizing
the importation of hazardous waste into Africa).
178. See Bamako Convention, supra note 162, at art.
4(3)(b) (describing how generators are subject to strict, joint
and several liability for wastes imported into Africa).
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stance toward restricting hazardous waste trading. In
this respect, if these trends continue, it will be increas-
ingly difficult for U.S. stakeholders to export hazardous
wastes abroad or to import hazardous wastes from for-
eign generators.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS To IMPROVE THE TRANSBOUNDARY
MOVEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTES
A. Different Regulatory Approaches
The regulatory framework governing international
hazardous waste transportation and disposal has con-
tributed to a perception that existing systems of over-
sight may inadequately protect the interests of receiving
countries. 179 To address these problems, several efforts
have aimed at reducing potential risks associated with
the transportation of hazardous wastes across interna-
tional borders. Recent efforts to restrict hazardous
waste trading have focused on two methods of control:
the "ban approach" and the prior informed consent
("PIC") approach. 180 Both methods present advantages
and disadvantages in areas of public policy, environ-
mental protection, and regulatory effectiveness.
The most restrictive agreements have established gen-
eral prohibitions on the transboundary movement of
179. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 1, at 10-11
(discussing how several incidents of improper transportation
and disposal raised international concern over the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous waste); See also BILL
MOYERS, GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND: THE INTERNATIONAL
TRAFFIC IN HAZARDOUS WASTE (1992) (describing incidents in
which exported hazardous waste was improperly managed
and resulted in significant risks to human health and the
environment).
180. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 1, at 22-26
(describing the methods of control implemented by both the
OCED and the EC).
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hazardous wastes. Generally, this type of approach
prohibits the exportation of hazardous waste to coun-
tries within specific geographic areas or to countries
outside specific trading organizations.181 The chief
benefit of the "ban approach" is that it decreases the
possibility that generators will pass their environmental
responsibilities onto foreign facilities which lack the en-
vironmental technology, regulatory infrastructure, or
training and experience necessary to ensure that the
waste management adequately protects human health
and the environment. 8 2 In this respect, the ban ap-
proach reduces fears that receiving countries will dis-
miss potential risks in order to obtain the income, tech-
nological benefits, and employment opportunities asso-
ciated with waste importation. For these reasons, pro-
ponents of the ban approach assert that a total prohibi-
tion of hazardous waste trading is the only regulatory
mechanism that adequately protects human health and
the environment. 183 It can also be argued that the ban
181. See, e.g., supra notes 103-107 and accompanying
text (describing how Decision 111/1 of the Basel Convention
prohibits OECD countries from exporting wastes to non-
OECD countries); Bamako Convention, supra note 162, at art.
4(3) (prohibiting the importation of hazardous waste into Af-
rica).
182. For example, even some industrialized countries
may be incapable of adequate hazardous waste oversight.
See NAFTA and the Environment, supra note 3, at 723 (indi-
cating that Mexico's hazardous waste programs may be
functioning at levels twenty-five years behind their American
counterparts). Although Mexico is one of the main recipients
of hazardous wastes exported from the United States, ap-
proximately 1.5 billion dollars of capital investment may be
required to properly dispose of the hazardous wastes cur-
rently existing within Mexico. See id. at 726.
183. See generally, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 1,
at 49-52 (describing how certain countries and environ-
mental organizations have sought a complete prohibition on
hazardous waste trading out of concerns related to the in-
adequate disposal of imported hazardous wastes).
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approach helps achieve goals of reducing the generation
of hazardous wastes. 8 4 Without the ability to export
waste to less expensive disposal sites in foreign coun-
tries, generators of hazardous waste have an increased
incentive to reduce their output.185
Despite these arguments, successfully establishing
general prohibitions on hazardous waste trading raises
several potential challenges. First, receiving nations
may rely on imported hazardous waste as a source for
valuable resources. For example, several developing
countries, such as the Philippines and India, rely on
imported lead-acid batteries as a source for lead. 186 If
lead-acid batteries are banned from exportation, not
only would such countries lose their source for lead, but
also there would be less reclamation of these hazardous
wastes. 8 7
184. See, e.g., Bamako Convention, supra note 162, at
preamble, para. 9 (indicating that the limitation of export op-
portunities helps reduce hazardous waste generation); Deci-
sion II/1, supra note 104, at 1.
185. The argument assumes that generators lack suffi-
cient incentives to reduce their output of hazardous wastes.
It should be noted, however, that because waste disposal in
any country requires significant resource expenditures, gen-
erators already have financial incentives to reduce waste
production. In this respect, it may be argued that companies
already have considerable motivation to keep waste genera-
tion at minimum levels. Thus, further restricting the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous wastes will only reduce
opportunities, not reduce waste generation.
186. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 1, at 58
(stating that in India and the Philippines, imported battery
scrap accounts for nearly seventy percent of the countries'
lead requirements). See also Chemical Manufacturers Asso-
ciation, CMA NEWS, Vol. 27, No. 7, at 6 (Mar. 20, 1996) (indi-
cating that the transboundary movement of hazardous waste
can facilitate recycling, reclamation, and recovery efforts).
187. Moreover, as developing nations become more reli-
ant on cars, computer equipment, and telecommunications
materials, there will be increased demand for the resources
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Second, while a ban ensures that hazardous wastes
remain within the country of origin, this fact may actu-
ally hinder safe disposal practices. Some countries that
generate hazardous wastes may be incapable of dispos-
ing of their wastes in an environmentally sound man-
ner.18 8 Hazardous wastes may be more safely and effi-
ciently managed if the wastes are exported from the
country of origin.189 In addition, generators that lack the
legal opportunity to export hazardous wastes may resort
to illegal exportation or disposal. 190
Third, bans may hinder the development of new
treatment and disposal facilities within developing
derived from such imported hazardous wastes. See
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 1, at 58. Note that the
Basel Convention offers a general exception to waste trading
restrictions where the wastes are required as raw material for
recycling or recovery. See Basel Convention, supra note 93,
at art. 4(9). Although Article 4(9) could be used to avoid
trading restrictions established under the Basel Convention,
other international agreements may not provide similar ex-
ceptions.
188. See Teresa Wallbaum, America's Lethal Export: The
Growing Trade in Hazardous Waste, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 889,
917 .(1991) (noting concerns that bans create situations
where countries which are unequipped to manage their own
wastes, whether through a lack of technology or insufficient
disposal sites, are faced with insurmountable waste prob-
lems).
189. See, e.g., Administration Considering Bilaterals to
Let Basel Parties Export Waste to United States, INT'L ENV'T
REP. (BNA), Vol. 19, No. 8, at 305 (April 17, 1996) (stating
that waste sent to the United States may be better managed
at less expense than if the waste remained within the country
of origin).
190. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE, Supra note 1, at 90 citing
Katharina Kimmer, Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes at the Interface of Environment and Trade (UNEP: En-
vironment and Trade series No. 7, 1994), pp. 58-59 (asserting
that bans on hazardous waste trading may contribute to se-
cret and illegal hazardous waste trafficking).
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countries. There are fewer incentives to build an ad-
vanced waste facility if that facility cannot receive
wastes and the associated financial revenues from for-
eign generators. Local generators, by themselves, may
not provide sufficient income to offset a new facility's
startup and operational expenses.
The second method of control is the prior informed
consent ("PIC") approach. This method requires the dis-
closure of specific information to the receiving country
so that the receiving country may make an informed de-
cision on whether the intended hazardous waste ship-
ment is permissible or not. The benefit to this approach
is that it enables waste trading to continue subject to
the control of the receiving country. Nevertheless, crit-
ics have raised several concerns with the PIC approach.
Opponents have argued that by facilitating the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous wastes, the PIC ap-
proach creates opportunity for the improper disposal of
hazardous wastes within receiving countries. 91  Al-
though the Basel Convention has sought to address this
issue by prohibiting hazardous waste exports that are
not managed in an environmentally sound manner,
there are concerns that the clarity of this standard is
inadequate. 192 Critics have also asserted that informa-
tion submitted by exporters might be inaccurate or in-
191. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 1, at 87 (ex-
pressing concern about how the operation of a hazardous
waste trading system may be used to facilitate illegal waste
trading activities).
192. See, e.g., David J. Abrams, Regulating the Interna-
tional Hazardous Waste Trade: A Proposed Global Solution, 28
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 827-31 (1990) (asserting that
the environmentally sound management standard is un-
clear); Christoph Hilz and Mark Radka, Environmental Nego-
tiation and Policy: The Basel Convention on Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 1 INT'L J.
OF ENV'T AND POLLUTION 55-72 (1991).
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complete resulting in receiving countries being misled
into improper decision-making. 193
It is clear that there are potential challenges to both
methods of addressing risks associated with the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous waste. Despite a
general recognition of the need to reform hazardous
waste trading requirements, the extent, scope, and ag-
gressiveness of those reforms has not been universally
accepted. Many of the reforms and trading prohibitions
initiated by developing countries are so restrictive that
other stakeholders have been reluctant to support the
new initiatives. This result has left both sides and has
rekindled efforts to either ban or drastically reduce the
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes.194 If this
trend continues, the transboundary movement of haz-
ardous wastes will become an increasingly limited or
impractical trade practice. Should this outcome occur,
all stakeholders would be deprived of the many potential
economic and environmental benefits resulting from the
transportation of hazardous wastes across international
borders.
To prevent this outcome, it is necessary to reform the
PIC approach by identifying system improvements that
safeguard against risks to receiving countries, yet re-
main acceptable to the interests of industrialized ex-
porting nations. While it may be impossible to find a
compromise that is universally appealing to all inter-
ested stakeholders, the following subsections discuss
several critical issues to suggest a regulatory system
193. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 1, at 87 (de-
scribing how receiving countries may be misled into import-
ing hazardous wastes destined for improper disposal or
treatment).
194. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (de-
scribing how ACP States established the Lome Convention in
response to perceived inadequacies of other legal approaches
that regulate the transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes).
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that operates in an efficient, safe, and fiscally pragmatic
manner. The following proposals may alleviate concerns
raised by receiving countries and simultaneously serve
as a means of avoiding a complete ban on waste expor-
tation, as several commentators, countries, and regional
agreements are now advocating.
B. Liability and Compensation Issues
In order to curtail efforts aimed at prohibiting or se-
verely restricting the transboundary movement of haz-
ardous wastes, it is necessary to address some coun-
tries' desire for more comprehensive and stringent con-
trols on the hazardous waste trade. One possible solu-
tion is the establishment of a global liability scheme for
damages resulting from the transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes. Commentators have suggested that
generators should be strictly liable for any damage
caused by their hazardous wastes, even if the damage
occurred within the receiving country.195
Establishment of a liability scheme would help allevi-
ate some nations' concerns about damages potentially
caused by the transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes. Without question, imposing strict or joint and
several liability on generators and transporters would
assist plaintiffs' financial recovery efforts. Currently,
when seeking compensation from U.S. generators, for-
195. See Jeffrey D. Williams, Comment, Trashing Devel-
oping Nations: The Global Hazardous Waste Trade, 39 BUFF.
L. REv. 275, 293 (1991) (stating that CERCLA's liability
scheme should apply to multinational companies that export
hazardous wastes to developing countries for disposal);
Teresa Wallbaum, America's Lethal Export: The Growing
Trade in Hazardous Waste, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 889, 921
(1991). See also Bamako Convention, supra note 162, at art.
4(3)(b) (imposing strict, joint and several liability on hazard-
ous waste generators); Basel Convention, supra note 93, at
art. 12 (encouraging the development of a liability and com-
pensation protocol).
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eign plaintiffs may need to rely on common law mecha-
nisms that are frequently dismissed under U.S. law
pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.196
However, there are several problems associated with the
establishment of a stringent liability scheme that oper-
ates on a global scale.
Subjecting generators and transporters to strict or
joint and several liability for any waste-related damages
could impose liability on innocent parties rather than
the actor at fault. For example, under such a liability
scheme, even if a disposal facility's negligence caused
an unintended release, the generator could be liable for
all damages despite having complied with every applica-
ble regulatory requirement. Imposing liability on multi-
ple defendants could also reduce a disposal facility's fi-
nancial incentive to ensure that imported waste is prop-
erly handled and disposed. Furthermore, such a liabil-
ity scheme would force exporters to scrutinize receiving
facilities' activities, but it would be difficult at best for a
generator to monitor the safe handling and disposal of
wastes after exportation. The receiving country's gov-
ernment is better able to supervise the safe operation of
a domestic facility than a generator which may be thou-
sands of miles away from the disposal site. 197
196. See Williams, supra note 195, at 302 (1991). See
also Julienne Adler, Comment, United States' Waste Export
Control Program: Burying Our Neighbors in Garbage, 40 AM.
U. L. REv. 885, 903-05 (1991) (discussing difficulties associ-
ated with the use of the United States tort system for envi-
ronmental damage that occurred outside the United States).
197. Not only is the government of the receiving facility
more able to oversee the safe handling and disposal of the
hazardous wastes because of the government's geographic
proximity to the facility, but this government would also have
experience with the operating, licensing, and waste manage-
ment standards applicable to the disposal facility. In this
respect, there is an economy of resources by preventing
situations where exporters have to "double check" the fulfill-
ment of a government's regulatory responsibilities.
20001 527
528 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
Finally, from a practical point of view, there would be
significant U.S. opposition to the imposition of such li-
ability on generators and transporters. In recent years,
one of the most contentious topics surrounding
CERCLA's reauthorization has been the issue of the
statute's strict, joint and several liability scheme. 198
Many legislators have attempted to reform CERCLA's
liability scheme out of concern that the statute punishes
innocent parties and wastes resources. 199 The fact that
CERCLA's liability scheme has been such a focus of po-
litical dispute indicates how difficult it would be to apply
a similar liability scheme onto all generators and trans-
porters. Moreover, if parties to the Basel Convention
adopted such a liability scheme, this issue could pre-
vent or further delay ratification of the Basel Convention
by the United States.
While the establishment of a strict, joint and several
liability scheme poses significant, if not insurmountable
challenges, it may be less controversial to establish an
international trust fund to provide financial assistance
for the cleanup of contamination caused by the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous wastes. 200 Similar to
198. See Lindsay Newland Bowker, Beyond Polarization:
Superfund Reform in Perspective, REAL ESTATE/ENVTL.
LIABILITY NEWS, Vol. 8, No. 6 (Jan. 24, 1997) (describing the
opposing positions on CERCLA reauthorization taken by the
Clinton Administration and the business community); Super-
fund: House Democrats' Letter to GOP Continues to Fault Ox-
ley's Bill, Negotiations, ENV'T REP. (BNA) (June 24, 1996)
available in LEXIS, 1996 DEN 121 d13 (describing legislative
efforts to reform CERCLA's liability scheme); Superfund Talks
Break Down, SUPERFUND WEEK, Vol. 11, No. 31 (Aug. 8, 1997)
(same).
199. See Carney Bradley Smith & Spellman, Update on
Superfund Reform, WASH. ENVTL. COMPLIANCE UPDATE, Vol. 3,
No. 5 (Nov. 1996) (describing political disagreements over the
reformation of CERCLA's liability scheme).
200. See Daniel Pruzin, Compromise Text Completed by
Basel Parties on Liability, Compensation Protocol for Spills,
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CERCLA's Superfund, a tax could be imposed on
stakeholders to provide financial resources to pay for
unattended cleanup costs. 201 Not only would this ap-
proach reduce concerns about risks associated with
transported hazardous wastes, but the approach would
reduce these concerns without subjecting potentially
innocent parties to the financial costs and legal burdens
associated with strict, joint and several liability.
C. Environmentally Sound Management Standards
If domestic legislation is enacted to meet the require-
ments of the Basel Convention, the United States must
prohibit any hazardous waste export that will not be
managed in an environmentally sound manner. While
the Basel Convention sets a worthwhile goal, there are
several problems associated with the implementation of
this requirement. In particular, the Basel Convention
provides no definitive rules to determine whether this
requirement has been satisfied.202
CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA), Vol. 23, No. 14, at 571 (July 2, 1999)
(discussing potential creation and use of a compensation
protocol for waste spills).
201. See CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1996) (de-
scribing the use of Superfund). Before adopting such a trust
fund for exported wastes, it would be necessary to determine
circumstances regarding the use of such funding, which par-
ties would provide financial contributions to the fund, the
amount each party would contribute, and how an organiza-
tion could be developed to oversee the use of the funds. Be-
cause the cleanup of unaddressed release sites containing
exported hazardous wastes obviously benefits public welfare
and the environment, it would be logical that government ap-
propriations would also provide financial contributions to the
fund.
202. See Basel Convention, supra note 93, at art. 2(8).
Although the Basel Convention gives no specific guidance on
this subject, there have been ongoing, but yet unsuccessful,
efforts to clarify the standard. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE, SU-
pra note 1, at 39 (indicating that a Basel Convention working
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Because of this lack of clarification, it is necessary to
establish standards to specify technical and functional
criteria that each receiving facility must satisfy in order
to manage hazardous waste in an environmentally
sound manner. Without a uniform set of standards,
there will be inconsistent or even conflicting decisions
between countries over what management practices are
environmentally sound. For instance, it is possible that
the EPA would impose RCRA standards on other coun-
tries as a means of ensuring that waste would be man-
aged in an environmentally sound manner. While the
EPA may forbid an export of hazardous waste to a par-
ticular receiving facility, other exporting countries may
allow similar exports. In this respect, U.S. generators
could be held to standards that other exporting coun-
tries do not require. 203 Another potential problem is that
a receiving country would oppose the management
standards that the EPA seeks to require. 204
In developing technical and functional standards, it is
important to recognize that there is no single regulatory
regime or set of numerical criteria for safeguarding hu-
group has yet to complete technical guidelines to supplement
the standard).
203. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 196, at 893 (indicating
that foreign receiving nations may not require the use of
source reduction methods or other environmental compliance
mandates).
204. It is important to note that the Basel Convention
does not clarify whether the exporting country, the receiving
country, or both countries determine whether the waste will
be managed in an environmentally sound manner. Because
the receiving country has greater interest and control over
the ultimate management and disposal of hazardous wastes,
it would be logical that the exporting country should rely on
the receiving country's certification that the environmentally
sound management standard has been satisfied, absent suf-
ficient evidence to the contrary. At the very least, any deci-
sion to prevent an exportation of hazardous waste should be
subject to judicial review.
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man health and the environment. Each country should
maintain the independence to tailor its hazardous waste
requirements to meet the needs and policy choices of its
citizens. For this reason, it would be logical to adopt
standards for environmentally sound management that
reflect operational practices common to most disposal
facilities. Accordingly, it would be important to ensure
that each disposal facility: (1) operated with authoriza-
tion from its government; (2) utilized technology and
pollution control devises which satisfied all the require-
ments of the jurisdiction where the facility is located; (3)
regularly monitored for pollution releases and reported
the results to the appropriate authorities; (4) provided
regular and appropriate training to its employees; (5)
handled wastes in a manner that did not create signifi-
cant hazards to human health or the environment; and
(6) had an updated and practiced emergency response
plan. Other criteria could be added, as necessary, to
reflect the specific operations of the waste facility. It
would also be important to ensure that the government
of the receiving facility maintained a regulatory infra-
structure capable of verifying the facility's compliance
with these standards. 05 The goal of these standards
would be to provide an operational baseline that pro-
vides for the safe management and disposal of hazard-
205. For example, the receiving country's government
would need to demonstrate that its regulators conduct peri-
odic auditing and facility inspections, take enforcement ac-
tion against violators, maintain adequate numbers of trained
personnel, etc. To minimize potential disputes between
countries, absent evidence to the contrary, the receiving
country's affirmation that such requirements were satisfied
would be sufficient to demonstrate the existence of its ade-
quate oversight capabilities. It would be important, however,
to establish an international panel to hear and resolve dis-
putes over issues related to these requirements. See, e.g.,
supra notes 143-146 and accompanying text (describing an
international panel which oversees signatory nations' compli-
ance with NAFTA's environmental requirements).
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ous wastes without precluding a receiving country from
adapting its disposal requirements to reflect domestic
objectives.
One advantage to using baseline standards is that the
system would enable waste transfers to be based on
each facility's ability to manage hazardous wastes in an
environmentally sound manner. In contrast to the sug-
gested approach, the Basel Convention proposes trading
prohibitions based on the geographic, economic, and
political associations of the country in which the facility
is located. 206 Moreover, the Basel Convention does not
clarify how a country can amend its status to partici-
pate in the hazardous waste trade. 207 Consequently, the
approach proposed within the Basel Convention may
result in several problems. For example, the Basel Con-
vention's export restrictions may violate international
trading rights established under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GAIT").208 These prohibitions may
also prevent the use of facilities that can manage haz-
ardous wastes in an environmentally sound manner and
deter countries from developing or improving their own
hazardous waste facilities. Moreover, these problems
may increase political opposition to ratification of the
206. See Decision 1111/, supra note 104, at 1 (prohibiting
the exportation of hazardous waste from OECD countries to
non-OECD countries); Cheryl Hogue and Joe Kirwin, Basel
Convention Parties to Discuss Possible Exceptions to Waste
Trade Ban, INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA), Vol. 21, No. 3, at 87-88
(Feb. 4, 1999) (noting how the Basel Convention would de-
termine that the country of Monaco may receive hazardous
waste because Monaco was surrounded by OECD countries,
while Israel was unable to receive hazardous wastes due to
Israel's geographic location).
207. See id.
208. See id. See also INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note
1, at 64-65, 79-80 (discussing potential legal conflicts be-
tween the Basel Convention's hazardous waste trading pro-
hibitions and anti-discrimination measures established by
GATT).
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Basel Convention. Therefore, the establishment of
baseline standards that focus on a facility's particular
operational practices would offer significant benefits es-
pecially compared to other possible approaches.
D. Increasing Compliance With Existing Requirements
In order to address concerns that the PIC approach
inadequately protects against the submission of incom-
plete or deceptive information reports, it is first neces-
sary to distinguish the two types of exporters who vio-
late PIC related requirements. The most concerning
violators are exporters who intentionally disregard ap-
plicable mandates. The second type of violator includes
exporters who attempt to comply with export require-
ments, but make mistakes. The different intents un-
derlying these types of violations should be reflected in
any effort to improve compliance.
The intentional violation of hazardous waste trans-
portation and disposal requirements represents a sig-
nificant problem requiring immediate attention. Not
only is the illegal management of hazardous wastes a
large and profitable practice, 2 9 but the amount of
smuggling is expected to increase. 210 In addition to the
209. See Impact of Illegal Trade in Ozone Depleters,
Wastes Rivals Drug Trade, Says Report, INT'L ENV'T REP.
(BNA), Vol. 21, No. 18, at 854 (Sept. 28, 1998) (discussing
the profitability, magnitude, and impacts associated with the
illegal trade in hazardous wastes); G-8 Environmental Minis-
ters Vow Crackdown on Illegal Trade in ODS, Hazardous
Wastes, INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA), Vol. 21, No. 8 at 357 (April
15, 1998). Environmental crime represents a $33.2 billion
dollar annual industry. See id. Crime organizations involved
in illicit drug and weapons sales have also become active in
the illegal movement and disposal of hazardous wastes. See
id.
210. See Illegal Traffic Should Be Higher Priority, INT'L
ENV'T REP. (BNA), Vol. 20, No. 14, at 702 (July 9, 1997).
There are several reasons for increased waste trafficking in-
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risks to human health and the environment, the prolif-
eration of hazardous waste smuggling undermines the
credibility of existing hazardous waste requirements;
thus, penalizing companies that operate within the
regulatory parameters. 21n
In addition, many government agencies lack sufficient
resources to implement thorough monitoring and en-
forcement programs. 212  The complex scientific and
regulatory determinations involved in waste inspection
also make it difficult to identify illegal waste
shipments. 213 These difficulties are especially problem-
cluding: (1) rising costs of waste disposal; (2) significant dif-
ference in disposal costs between countries; (3) large profits
generated from the illegal trade in hazardous waste; (4) diffi-
culties in proving the criminal nature of violations; (5) liber-
alization and growth of international trade; (6) inconsistent
definitions of hazardous waste; (7) a lack of coordinated en-
forcement mechanisms; and (8) the complex nature of the
legal instruments governing the transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes. See WTO/CTE, Communication from the
Secretariate of the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, WT/CTE/W90,
July 20, 1998.
211. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 1, at
126 (noting that recyclers who do not comply with environ-
mental requirements can obtain competitive advantages over
recyclers who comply with regulatory mandates).
212. See Impact of Illegal Trade in Ozone Depleters,
Wastes Rivals Drug Trade, Says Report, INT'L ENv'T REP.
(BNA), Vol. 21, No. 18 at 855 (Sept. 28, 1998) (reporting that
government departments have insufficient resources for
monitoring the hazardous waste trade); Report Calls for More
Inspections, Sampling to Detect Illegal Hazardous Waste
Movement, INT'L ENv'T REP. (BNA), VOL. 20, NO. 21, at 976,
(Oct. 15, 1997) (stating that between 1995-1996, the gov-
emment of Canada conducted only twenty-one border visits
and took only twelve samples of hazardous waste imports out
of more than 14,000 truckloads of hazardous waste imports).
213. See, e.g., Marcia E. Williams & Jonathon Z. Can-
non, Rethinking the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
for the 1990's, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,063, 10,064 (1991) avail-
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atic with regard to the hazardous waste trade. Effective
oversight requires adequate performance and coordina-
tion between several parties on an international level. 214
Therefore, it is unlikely that a significant percentage of
hazardous waste smugglers will be apprehended. 215 In
order to improve this situation, it is important to focus
on reform measures that can be widely implemented
without excessive resource expenditures. To improve
surveillance capabilities, there must be a greater coor-
dination and exchange of information between environ-
mental and customs agents. 2 6 Furthermore, it would be
able in LEXIS, Environmental Law Reporter File (calling
RCRA's regulations "the most complex environmental regula-
tions ever written"); Louis R. Vera-Morales, Dumping in the
International Backyard: Exportation of Hazardous Wastes to
Mexico, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 353, 359 (1994) (stating that it is
almost impossible to prevent illegal waste exportation with-
out detailed on-the-spot chemical analysis).
214. See Report Calls for More Inspections, Sampling to
Detect Illegal Hazardous Waste Movement, INT'L ENV'T REP.
(BNA), Vol. 20, No. 21, at 977 (Oct. 15, 1997) (stating that in
attempting to control the transboundary movements of haz-
ardous waste, "the chain is only as strong as the weakest
link").
215. See Impact of Illegal Trade in Ozone Depleters,
Wastes Rivals Drug Trade, Says Report, INT'L ENV'T REP.
(BNA), Vol. 21, No. 18, at 854 (Sept. 28, 1998).
216. For instance, in 1996, EPA and the U.S. Customs
Service signed a memorandum of understanding ("MOU") in-
tended to help prevent the illegal importation and exportation
of hazardous waste. See Environmental Protection Agency,
Customs Service Cracking Down on Smuggling of CFCs, Haz-
ardous Waste, INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA), Vol. 19, No. 6, at 219
(Mar. 20, 1996). As part of the agreement, EPA agreed to
provide Customs Service inspectors with training and notice
on the identification and monitoring of hazardous waste. See
id. at 220. The Customs Service agreed to provide EPA with
hazardous waste manifests for imports of hazardous waste.
See id. Similar efforts could be adopted in other countries or
between different countries.
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beneficial to further coordinate international oversight
and enforcement operations between exporting and re-
ceiving nations. 17 Such efforts would make enforce-
ment efforts more successful, efficient, and cost effec-
tive.
Moreover, there must be increased emphasis on se-
curing criminal convictions against intentional violators
of hazardous waste transportation requirements. Many
hazardous waste agreements authorize strong penalties
for severe environmental violations; however, there have
been very few convictions. 218 If potential violators be-
217. See G-8 Environment Ministers Vow Crackdown On
Illegal Trade in ODS, Hazardous Wastes, INT'L ENV'T REP.
(BNA), Vol. 21, No. 8, at 357 (April 15, 1998) (suggesting that
governments could stem illegal trading in hazardous wastes
by: (1) training environmental enforcement officials at an in-
ternational level; (2) improving transboundary information
exchanges between police, customs officers, and other en-
forcement agencies; and (3) providing assistance for devel-
oping countries to comply with environmental agreements).
Some existing programs and coordinated efforts could also be
more widely applied or adopted in other countries. See, e.g.,
La Paz Agreement, supra note 121, at art. II (instituting the
exchange of monitoring and enforcement-related information
between the United States and Mexico); Environmental Offi-
cials Meet on Border Transport of Hazardous Waste, INT'L
ENV'T REP. (BNA), Vol. 19, No. 6, at 221 (Mar. 20, 1996) (de-
scribing a meeting attended by government officials of Mexico
and the United States to coordinate information exchanges
on the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes).
218. See Report Calls for More Inspections, Sampling to
Detect Illegal Hazardous Waste Movement, INT'L ENV'T REP.
(BNA), Vol. 20, No. 21, at 977 (Oct. 15, 1997) (reporting that
between 1988 and 1996, there was only one trial conviction
and three guilty pleas out of seventeen cases prosecuted un-
der Canada's hazardous waste export and import regula-
tions); Two Plead Guilty in Conspiracy to Ship Wastes, INT'L
ENV'T REP. (BNA), Vol. 19, No. 15,. at 682 (July 24, 1996)
available in LEXIS, International Environment Reporter File
(stating that the first successful U.S. government operation
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lieve there is little risk of conviction, these parties are
less likely to comply with applicable requirements. This
result endangers health and the environment and pe-
nalizes generators that devote the necessary time and
expense to comply with regulations. As such, the threat
of conviction is a crucial component for compliance as-
surance and fair competition within the industry.
While the intentional violation of hazardous waste re-
quirements represent the most pressing concern, it is
also necessary to minimize the occurrence of uninten-
tional violations. To improve compliance among unin-
tentional violators, the focus should be on assistance
rather than on enforcement and the imposition of pen-
alties. The EPA has already developed compliance as-
sistance programs in other regulatory areas, and similar
approaches could be further implemented to address
the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. 219
Since requirements governing the transboundary
movement of hazardous waste are so complex, the
availability of such assistance would be useful.
To encourage the use of such aid, regulated entities
must be able to request governmental assistance with-
out subjecting themselves to an increased risk of penal-
ties.220 Regulatory agencies could agree to waive civil
penalties. Moreover, these agencies could recommend
to catch illegal hazardous waste shipments occurred as re-
cently as July 1996).
219. See Judith Jacobs, Changes in EPA Regulatory Cul-
ture Sought by Industry at Task Force Meeting, CHEM. REG.
REP. (BNA), Vol. 23, No. 4, at 145, 168-169 (April 23, 1999)
(describing activities and efforts taken by EPA's Reinvention
Action Council). As part of the EPA's efforts to improve envi-
ronmental compliance generally, the Agency has noted the
need to provide the regulated community with assistance
centers, training opportunities, compliance guides, and vari-
ous pilot programs. See id.
220. See id. (noting that the EPA should not approach
compliance issues with assumptions of industry's wrongdo-
ing, instead the EPA should aim to assist regulated entities).
20001 537
538 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
against criminal prosecution for violations discovered
during, or as the result of, the provision of regulatory
assistance. 22 1 A benefit to a waiver policy is that by
helping regulated entities to comply with environmental
requirements, there will be fewer environmental viola-
tions. Therefore, government regulators may focus on
enforcement resources against intentional violators.
E. Broadening Global Participation
Over the last several years, it has become increasingly
clear that policies and regulations involving environ-
mental protection and pollution standards represent
global issues that can not be solved without considering
the effect and ramifications on international interests. 222
This fact is especially relevant with regard to the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous wastes because there
are many nations involved. Wastes are transported
through international territories, and the effects of im-
proper handling and disposal of hazardous wastes can
transcend national boundaries. 223 For these reasons, for
221. There could be specific criteria that must be satis-
fied in order to qualify for such a waiver (e.g., the violation
was a first time offense; the violation did not result in immi-
nent and substantial endangerment, or serious actual harm;
the facility expeditiously corrected any violations, etc.).
222. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 1, at 2
(describing several international disputes over environmental
issues).
223. Examples of environmental contamination that
transcend national boundaries include acid rain, groundwa-
ter and surface water contamination, the killing of migratory
species, etc. In addition, U.S. exported hazardous waste has
been returned to the United States through the importation
of foreign commodities. See Jeffery D. Williams, Comment,
Trashing Developing Nations: The Global Hazardous Waste
Trade, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 275, 290 (1991) (stating that U.S.
industrial sludge contaminated with heavy metals may be
exported, sold as fertilizer, and used on produce later mar-
keted in the United States).
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a successful approach to the transboundary movement
of hazardous wastes, it is necessary to obtain the input
and support of as many countries as possible.
Since the participation of developing nations is an es-
sential component in the effective regulation of hazard-
ous waste trading, any regulatory system must ade-
quately address the concerns of less-developed coun-
tries. If developing nations continue to believe that
waste control methods are inadequate, there will be
further efforts to prohibit or drastically restrict the haz-
ardous waste trade. Because there is a wide disparity in
the amount of regulatory infrastructure, oversight capa-
bility, and resources available for hazardous waste pro-
grams between countries, 224 it may be necessary for de-
veloped nations to assume additional responsibilities in
order to ensure that developing nations participate and
support hazardous waste programs. Developed nations
may need to provide financial assistance to lower in-
come nations, or take greater efforts to ensure that ex-
ports meet applicable environmental requirements. 225
Such measures will help obtain the broad participation
necessary to effectuate a functional regulatory regime.
It is also important that receiving nations, especially
developing nations that receive hazardous waste, accept
appropriate responsibility for problems that may result
from the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes.
Receiving countries that consent to receive hazardous
224. See, e.g., Maquiladora Industry, Mexican Authorities
Reach Agreement on Hazardous Waste, INT'L ENV'T REP.
(BNA), Vol. 21, No. 6, at 271 (Mar. 18, 1998) (indicating that
due to a lack of regulatory infrastructure, as of 1999, Mexico
could not assess the amount of hazardous waste generated
by its own industrial sectors). It has been estimated that
only fifteen percent of the toxic industrial waste generated in
Mexico is disposed of properly. NAFTA and the Environment,
supra note 3, at 724.
225. See Basel Convention, supra note 93, at art. 10
(providing that signatories should account for the needs of
developing countries).
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wastes must accept responsibility for wastes that are
not managed in an environmentally sound manner.226 If
improper waste disposal occurs, a receiving country
must rectify the weaknesses in its domestic environ-
mental programs. The provision of financial assistance
to developing nations would facilitate these reforms. If
necessary reformations are unrealized, the receiving
country must reject the proposed waste import. By
contrast, an exporting nation must ensure that the re-
ceiving nation has provided informed consent before any
exportation occurs. Recognizing these roles will focus
the responsibilities of both exporting and receiving
countries.
F. Reducing the Generation of Hazardous Wastes
Several statutes and environmental agreements gov-
erning the transboundary movement of hazardous waste
also seek to reduce generation of hazardous waste. 227
The rationale is that by reducing the amount of hazard-
ous wastes, there will be fewer risks associated with the
movement and disposal of such materials. Unfortu-
nately, in their attempts to reduce hazardous waste
generation, most statutes and agreements focus efforts
on restricting the transboundary movement of hazard-
ous wastes, rather than improving production and
226. In contrast, a few commentators have blamed ex-
porters of hazardous waste for the disposal-related problems
occurring in the receiving countries. See Hugh Marbury,
Hazardous Waste Exportation: The Global Manifestation of
Environmental Racism, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 251, 29.1-92
(1995) (accusing the United States government of being guilty
of "environmental racism"); Williams, supra note 195 at 289
(accusing the United States of "economic imperialism").
227. See, e.g., RCRA § 1003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)
(1996); Bamako Convention, supra note 162 at Preamble,
para. 9.
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manufacturing techniques to reduce waste generation. 228
The underlying assumption is that by making the
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes burden-
some and expensive, generators will be encouraged to
produce less hazardous waste. 229
However, this approach may result in several prob-
lems. Any approach that imposes high costs and regu-
latory burdens on all types of hazardous waste genera-
tors is over-broad. It is unproductive to impose obliga-
tions on segments of industry that have already reduced
the generation of hazardous wastes to minimum levels.
Furthermore, raising the costs associated with the
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes may in-
crease pressures to find less expensive disposal facilities
that are less likely to operate with the safest environ-
mental control technology. Moreover, high disposal
costs increase the use of illegal disposal operations. 23 0
As an alternative, a proposed approach would provide
increased financial incentives to reduce the amount and
toxicity of generated hazardous waste. 23' If additional
228. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 1, at
112 (stating that the Basel Convention's approach to reduc-
ing hazardous waste generation is "limited").
229. See OECD, Trade Measures in the Basel Convention
and the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, at 8 (stating that the Basel Con-
vention is designed to raise the costs of disposal and reduce
disposal alternatives in order to give facilities economic in-
centives to reduce the generation of hazardous wastes).
230. See WTO/CTE, Communication from the Secretari-
ate of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes, WT/CTE/W90, July 20
1998 (noting the relationship between illegal waste disposal
activities and the cost of disposal); Illegal Traffic Should Be
Higher Priority, INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA), Vol. 20, No. 14, at 702
(July 9, 1997) (indicating that high costs of disposal have
contributed to an increase in hazardous waste trafficking).
231. For example, companies could receive tax incen-
tives or low interest loans to support the development and
growth of reduced risk technology.
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requirements were necessary to minimize waste genera-
tion, it would be more practical to focus requirements
on segments of industry with the greatest potential to
reduce hazardous waste generation. Such measures
would achieve the same goal of minimizing risks associ-
ated with hazardous wastes without encumbering gen-
erators.
CONCLUSION
Both generators and receiving countries have signifi-
cant incentives to engage in the transboundary move-
ment of hazardous wastes. The transboundary move-
ment of hazardous wastes can reduce disposal costs,
decrease risks associated with hazardous waste man-
agement and disposal, and supply resources for receiv-
ing countries. Nevertheless, over the last several years
there has been an increase in the legal restrictions,
penalties, and costs associated with the transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes. U.S. laws provide do-
mestic generators with several financial and legal in-
centives to export their wastes. Those laws, however,
lack important mechanisms to ensure that exported
hazardous wastes do not result in risks to human
health and the environment. Out of concern that ex-
isting oversight measures were inadequate, several re-
ceiving countries, exporting nations, and domestic in-
terest groups have sought to significantly restrict, or
even ban, hazardous waste trading. If the current ini-
tiatives continue, it will be increasingly difficult or fi-
nancially impractical for all generators to export haz-
ardous wastes.
In order to avoid this outcome, it is necessary to ad-
dress the variety of concerns associated with the trans-
portation of hazardous wastes across international bor-
ders. Although significant changes may be required, it
would be possible to respond to these concerns and still
retain the PIC approach to waste exportation. These
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initiatives would include: (1) providing resources to pay
for unaddressed cleanup costs resulting from the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous wastes; (2) estab-
lishing definitive baseline technical and operational
standards for hazardous waste receiving facilities; (3)
improving oversight mechanisms by revising enforce-
ment approaches and expanding compliance assistance
opportunities; (4) providing financial assistance to de-
veloping countries; and (5) reconsidering the current
approach to minimizing the generation of hazardous
waste.
The proposed approach offers several important bene-
fits to hazardous waste stakeholders. First, and fore-
most, these measures may be necessary to ensure the
broad continuation and availability of hazardous waste
trading opportunities. Unless receiving countries are
assured that they are protected against potential risks
to human health and the environment associated with
waste importation, the countries will continue to enact
prohibitive trading measures such as waste import
bans. Second, the proposed approach would ensure
that all exporters and receiving facilities are subject to
similar managing and disposal standards. This result
would help prevent inconsistent or conflicting export de-
cision-making between nations. Third, the proposal
would establish that strict, joint and several liabilities
are not imposed on innocent parties, but remain fo-
cused on the' parties that bear the most responsibility
for the unintended releases. Finally, the proposal clari-
fies and distinguishes the duties and responsibilities
that receiving and exporting nations must recognize
when participating in hazardous waste trading.
While some stakeholders may resist significant
changes to the existing structures, it must be recog-
nized that in order to preserve the ability to export and
import hazardous wastes on a broad scale, it may be
necessary to undertake some reforms and accept some
level of increased regulation in order to avoid more re-
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strictive consequences. In this respect, the proposed
approach represents both a necessary challenge and an
important opportunity.
